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463 
Panel II:  Indecency on the Internet:  
Constitutionality of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 
Moderator:   Nicholas J. Jollymore, Esq.a 
Panelists:  Parry Aftab, Esq.b 
 Preeta D. Bansal, Esq.c 
 Theodore C. Hirt, Esq.d 
 Chris Hansen, Esq.e 
 David H. Pawlik, Esq.f 
 
MR. JOLLYMORE:  Although this panel is entitled Inde-
cency and the Internet:  The Constitutionality of the 1996 
Telecommunications Act, we will also address other issues. 
My name is Nick Jollymore and I am a lawyer at Time 
Inc., the book and magazine publishing subsidiary of Time 
Warner, Inc.  Until two years ago, the only business in which 
Time Inc. was engaged was the publication of books and 
magazines.  As a print publisher, we were privileged to en-
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joy the broadest First Amendment protection available.1  
 
1. Despite the First Amendment’s unambiguous language that Congress 
create “no law” abridging free speech, U.S. CONST. amend. I, freedom of speech 
has never been protected absolutely.  See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 
666 (1925) (“It is a fundamental principle long established, that the freedom of 
speech and of the press which is secured by the Constitution does not confer an 
absolute right to speak or publish.”); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 
568, 571 (1942) (“It is well understood that the right of free speech is not abso-
lute.”); see also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (refusing to interpret the 
First Amendment as protecting all speech); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 
(1954) (stating that rejecting obscenity from First Amendment protection is im-
plicit in the history of the First Amendment).  The Supreme Court created and 
has long recognized a hierarchy in the First Amendment’s protection of speech 
from government regulation, affording greater protection to certain types of 
speech, and leaving other forms of speech more vulnerable to regulation.  For a 
defense of such speech categorization, see John H. Ely, Flag Desecration:  A Case 
Study in the Roles of Categorization as Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975).  For an argument advocating the elimination of speech 
categorization and affording all varieties of speech equal value, see O. Lee Reed, 
Is Commercial Speech Really Less Valuable Than Political Speech?  On Replacing Val-
ues and Categories in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 1 (1996).  The 
Supreme Court explained in Roe v. Wade that such a speech hierarchy is not rec-
ognized by the U.S. Constitution:  
The Constitution makes no mention of the rational-basis test, or the spe-
cific verbal formulations of intermediate and strict scrutiny by which 
this Court evaluates claims . . . these tests or standards are not, and do 
not purport to be rights protected by the Constitution.  Rather, they are 
judge-made methods for evaluating and measuring the strength and 
scope of constitutional rights or for balancing the constitutional rights 
of individuals against the competing interests of government. 
410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
The degree of First Amendment protection afforded speech generally de-
pends on the type of speech involved.  See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 930 (2d ed. 1988) (stating that commercial speech, obscen-
ity, child-pornography, and defamatory speech receive lesser, or no, First 
Amendment protection because of their content, regardless of the media through 
which they are communicated).  The extent of First Amendment protection in the 
electronic media, however, is related not to the content of the speech, but rather 
to the medium in which the speech is communicated.  Id. at 1003.  Generally, 
print media receives the highest level of protection of the communications me-
dia, while the electronic media, including broadcasting, cable television, and 
computer networks, have received the lowest.  The rationale cited by the courts 
for hierarchical protection based on the type of medium in which speech is 
communicated, as compared to the content of the speech, is technological charac-
teristics of the media, which most commonly include pervasiveness and fre-
quency scarcity.  See The Message in the Medium:  The First Amendment on the In-
formation Superhighway, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1062, 1069-70 (1994). 
Different news media receive varying degrees of First Amendment protec-
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Now, however, we also operate in the environment of cyber-
space.  Time Inc. has made a huge investment, funded by 
our corporate parent, in online services.  We have, I would 
say, a very elaborate and one of the most popular World 
Wide Web (“Web”)2 sites, called Pathfinder.3  Pathfinder 
                                                                                                                                  
tion in accordance with the particular characteristics of each means of communi-
cation. See FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (“We have long recognized 
that each medium of expression presents special First Amendment problems.”) 
(citing Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952)); Southeastern Promo-
tions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975) (“Each medium of expression, of 
course, must be assessed for First Amendment purposes by standards suited to 
it, for each may present its own problems.”); see also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. 
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969) (applying a flexible First Amendment standard 
to broadcast media due to its unique problem of scarcity, and stating that “dif-
ferences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First 
Amendment standards applied to them”); Group W Cable, Inc. v. City of Santa 
Cruz, 669 F. Supp. 954, 960 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (noting that newspaper and other 
print media enjoy broad protection from government interference).  The print 
media has consistently been afforded the greatest First Amendment protection of 
the various media. See Group W Cable, 669 F. Supp. at 959-60.  For a discussion of 
the degrees of protection afforded the different media, see generally Group W Ca-
ble, Inc. v. City of Santa Cruz, 669 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Cal. 1987).  For a persuasive 
argument that the extent of protection afforded the different media should not be 
based on technological considerations, see generally The Message in the Medium:  
The First Amendment on the Information Superhighway, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1062, 
1069-70 (1994); Laurence H. Tribe, The Constitution in Cyberspace:  Law and 
Liberty Beyond the Electronic Frontier, Keynote Address at the First Conference 
on Computers, Freedom and Privacy (Mar. 26, 1991) (on file with Harvard Law 
School Library) (“[T]he Constitution’s norms, at their deepest level, must be in-
variant under merely technological transformations.”). 
2. The Web is one of three methods by which people can locate and retrieve 
information on the Internet.  ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 836 (E.D. Pa.), prob. 
juris. noted, 117 S. Ct. 554 (1996); Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 929 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996).  It is the most technologically advanced information system on the Inter-
net, as well as the most rapidly developing, easy-to-use, and popular means of 
searching for and gathering information. Id.  One commentator aptly explained 
how it functions:  
The Web is a system of ‘pages’ or ‘sites’ consisting of video, interactive 
graphics, and text.  ‘Hyperlinks’ connect the pages and enable users to 
‘point and click’ their way through the Web.  The first page, or screen, 
of a location on the Web, or ‘Web site,’ is the ‘home page.’ 
Nicholas Robbins, Baby Needs a New Pair of Cybershoes:  The Legality of Casino 
Gambling on the Internet, 2 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 7, ¶ 6 (1996) (citations omitted).  
For a brief history and explanation of the basic operation of the Web, see ACLU, 
929 F. Supp. at 836.  For detailed information about the Web and its history, see 
BRYAN PFAFFENBERGER, WORLD WIDE WEB BIBLE 53-66 (2d ed. 1996).  See also About 
the World Wide Web (visited May 28, 1997) 
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contains a collection of magazine and book contents from 
both our own properties and those under license.  We sell 
advertising on it, and are looking forward to its eventually 
making a profit. 
Most, if not all, of our magazines have their own pres-
ence on the Web, if not as Web sites, then on one of the com-
mercial services, such as America Online (“AOL”) or 
CompuServe.4  Some of our magazine Web sites include, for 
example, People Online, Time Online, Sports Illustrated On-
line, Sports Illustrated for Kids Online, Money Online, Fortune 
Online, and Entertainment Weekly Online.5 
For our editors, who are by and large print editors, and 
for our lawyers, who are exclusively print lawyers, we are in 
a new realm where it is no longer certain that we, as entities 
                                                                                                                                  
<http://www.w3.org/pub/WWW/WWW>. 
3. Time, Time Warner’s Pathfinder (visited Apr. 16, 1997) <http://path-
finder.com>. 
4. AOL and CompuServe are online service providers (“OSP’s”), which are 
national businesses that provide individuals with a means of accessing the Inter-
net. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 833.  In contrast to Internet service providers (“ISP’s”) 
which provide access to the Internet only, OSPs, in addition to providing Inter-
net access, provide access to proprietary content unavailable to nonsubscribers.  
See Gerald Leibovits & Ian M. Singer, Litigators who Untangle the Web Will Find 
Scores of Valuable Sites, N.Y. L.J., May 20, 1997, at 5.  AOL is currently the leading 
OSP, with 8 million customers, Compuserve is the second-largest, with 5.3 mil-
lion subscribers, Microsoft is third-largest with 2.2 million subscribers, and Prod-
igy is the fourth largest, with 900,000 subscribers.  See Counting up the Online 
Market, MULTIMEDIA WIRE, June 4, 1997 (1997 WL 7141311); Review & Comment on 
the News, 5 REP. ON MICROSOFT 11, June 2, 1997 (1997 WL 8661561).  Others esti-
mate Microsoft Network’s subscriber list at 2.3 million.  See Jon Schwartz, Micro-
soft Backs off From Net Access, S.F. CHRON., June 3, 1997, at C1 (1997 WL 6698669); 
Stuart J. Johnston, Microsoft Grows On:  Rising Sales and New Products Keep Growth 
Rates Soaring, INFO. WEEK, June 2, 1997 (1997 WL 7602597).  For a list of the 14 
major internet service providers and their current number of subscribers, see 
Counting up the Online Market, MULTIMEDIA WIRE, June 4, 1997 (1997 WL 7141311).  
The “Big Three,” AOL, Compuserve, and Microsoft, hold over 75% of the U.S. 
market, E-mail Ranks Swell by 12.5 Million in First Quarter, REP. ON ELECTRONIC 
COM., June 3, 1997 (1997 WL 8582658), and 35% of the European market, Kim-
berly A. Strassel, On the Line:  Small Internet Firms in EU Are Bracing For Consoli-
dation, WALL. ST. J. EUR., at 1 (1997 WL-WSJE 3812207). 
5. Time, Time Warner’s Pathfinder (visited Apr. 16, 1997) <http://path-
finder.com>. 
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involved in cyberspace, enjoy the same broad First Amend-
ment protection enjoyed by the print media.6  Although no 
one knows exactly what is going to happen, we are certainly 
interested in what the courts will do with the First Amend-
ment issues related to the Internet (“Net”).7  I certainly am 
excited to hear what our panelists have to say about it. 
Before I introduce our panelists, however, let me briefly 
outline the topics that we are going to discuss today.  First, 
we are going to talk about the Internet and what it is.  Many 
of us, including myself, are trying to understand what the it 
is.  In ACLU v. Reno,8 a case that we will discuss in some de-
tail, Judge Sloviter of the Third Circuit made very extensive 
findings of fact concerning cyberspace.9  These findings, in 
my opinion, are some of the clearest statements about what 
the Internet is and how it works.  In his decision, Judge 
Sloviter also made a rather sweeping statement regarding 
 
6. See supra note 1 (explaining greater First Amendment protection afforded 
print media). 
7. The Internet currently consists of 13 million host computers,  BRYAN 
PFAFFENBERG, WORLD WIDE WEB BIBLE 36 (2d ed. 1996), linked by more than 
50,000 connected computer networks.  Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 925.  The Internet is 
not controlled by a single entity, and the information found on it is actually lo-
cated on individual computers throughout the world. Id. at 926.  Approximately 
30 to 60 million people currently have access to the Internet, and that number is 
expected to exceed 100 million by 1998.  JILL H. ELLSWORTH & MATTHEW V. 
ELLSWORTH, MARKETING ON THE INTERNET 5 (2d ed. 1997) (quoting Vinton Cerf, an 
early Internet developer, testifying to the United States House of Representa-
tives).  The Internet community has recently experienced exponential growth. See 
Curt A. Canfield & Joseph Labbe, Web or Windows?:  Planning for Internet/Intranet 
Technology—Explosive growth Experienced, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 21, 1997, at S2.  The in-
creased use of the Internet is due in part to increased advertising and ease of ob-
taining access. See Christopher Wolf & Scott Shorr, Cybercops Are Cracking Down 
on Internet Fraud:  Federal and State Officials Have Stepped Up Efforts in the Battle 
Against Info-Highway Robbery, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 13, 1997, at B12. 
8. 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa.), prob. juris. noted, 117 S. Ct. 554 (1996) (holding 
that speakers could not be held liable for indecent communication on the Inter-
net because there were no effective means by which they could ensure that mi-
nors did not have access to speech). 
9. Id. at 830-49 (detailing the nature and development of cyberspace, the 
Internet, and the World Wide Web, and describing Internet access to sexually 
explicit material, including existing and proposed methods of age verification). 
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cyberspace, commenting that, “[t]he Internet is . . . a unique 
and wholly new medium of worldwide human communica-
tion.”10 
I, for one, think the statement is true and accurate.  The 
Internet is, indeed, unique for a number of reasons.  First, no 
single person controls it.  In fact, control of Internet content 
is dispersed among thousands, and probably millions, of in-
dividuals and/or entities.11  Therefore, the Internet is unlike 
a printing press, a broadcast station, or a cable television sys-
tem. 
Second, the Internet is unique because there are very low 
entrance barriers.12  The old saw that “freedom of the press 
belongs to those who own one” is no longer true because the 
barriers to entry on the Internet require an investment, as 
Judge Sloviter estimated, of as little as maybe $2,000.13 
Third, the Internet is unique because it is very popular;14  
 
10. Id. at 844 (stating that “[t]he Internet is therefore a unique and wholly 
new medium of worldwide communication.”). 
11. Id. at 832 (“No single entity—academic, corporate, governmental, or 
non-profit—administers the Internet[, rather it is] hundreds and thousands of 
separate operators of computers and computer networks [without a] central-
ized . . . control point . . .”). 
12. Id. at 843.  The ACLU court described the unusually small entrance bar-
riers:  
The start up and operating costs entailed by communication on the 
Internet are significantly lower than those associated with use of other 
forms of mass communication, such as television, radio, newspapers, 
and magazines.  This enables operation of their own Web sites not only 
by large companies, such as Microsoft and Time Warner, but also by 
small, not-for-profit groups, such as Stop Prisoner Rape and Critical 
Path AIDS Project. 
ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 843. 
13. Id. at 833 (stating that “[w]ith an investment of as little as $2,000.00 and 
the cost of a telephone line, individuals, non-profit organizations, advocacy 
groups, and businesses can offer their own dial-in computer bulletin board ser-
vice where friends, members, subscribers, or customers can exchange ideas and 
information.”). 
14. Id. at 831 (explaining the extraordinary growth of the Internet in recent 
years, with fewer than 300 computers linked to the Internet in 1981, as compared 
to over 9,400,000 in 1996).  As of 1996, almost twelve million people in the United 
States alone subscribed to one of the major commercial online services. Id. at 833. 
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it has captured both our attention and our time.  In Reno, the 
three-judge panel estimated that there are now forty million 
Internet users, and that by the end of the century there will 
be 200 million users.15  Certainly, no single magazine has 
such a circulation. 
The power of the Internet makes a lot of people, includ-
ing myself, nervous at times.  For example, when I was get-
ting ready for work yesterday, I heard a news report on Na-
tional Public Radio that the Iraqi government newspaper 
had published a report attacking the Internet as “‘the end of 
civilizations, cultures, interests and ethics.’”16  The Iraqi 
newspaper also alleged that the Internet “‘is one of the 
American means to enter every house in the world. . . . They 
want to become the only source for controlling human be-
ings in the new electronic village.’”17 
Another country struck with Internet-phobia is the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China (“PRC”), which, you may have 
heard, last year announced its intention to construct an 
intranet for circulating information within the countries’ 
boundaries in order to further its goal of protecting its citi-
zens from information from foreign sources.18 
 
15. Id. at 831. 
16. See Matthew McAllester, The Surfing Evangelists, NEWSDAY, Feb. 23, 1997, 
at A41 (quoting the Iraqi government newspaper Al-Jumhuriya); Financial 
DIGEST, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1997, at C8; Off the Ticker, Business, S.F. EXAMINER, 
Feb. 18, 1997, at C1. 
17. Id. 
18. See CompuServe At Work on Forming Alliance to Enter Chinese Market, 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 10, 1997, at 1F (discussing the PRC’s concern about giv-
ing its citizens access to politically sensitive or pornographic materials).  China 
established its intranet, the China Wide Web (“CWW”), because it wanted a 
more controllable Internet as a result of its “nervousness about the openness of 
the Internet and its belief that the Internet as a “threat to social order.” Mark La-
Pedus, China Intranet to Connect 50 Cities, ELECTRONIC BUYERS NEWS, Feb. 3, 1997, 
at 66.  In fact, China requires American citizens who sign up for CWW access to 
register with local police and to promise not to commit crimes against the coun-
try.  Id.  CWW last year banned what it deemed “illegal Internet addresses,” 
those addresses containing material it judged pornographic or politically sensi-
tive, and recently banned the Web sites of CNN and the Wall Street Journal.  Id.  
   
470 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [7:463 
In the United States, we have our own reaction, based on 
similar concerns, to the power of the Internet.  But, because 
we come from a First Amendment tradition, we have a much 
more moderated response.  That response is embodied, in 
part, in several provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996 (“Telecom Act”),19 which we will discuss today. 
The second topic this panel will discuss is the First 
Amendment.20  I have been teaching a course here at Ford-
ham Law School for fifteen years on the First Amendment 
and mass media, and I can say one thing without equivoca-
tion:  I have never met a student who is not in favor of the 
First Amendment.  The moral values embodied in the First 
Amendment are part of a tradition that we all share, if not 
cherish.21  I presume that that is true of our panelists as well, 
                                                                                                                                  
An intranet is an internal computer network using Internet computer network 
technology and effectively “sits on the side” of the Internet and can be connected 
only when those controlling it allow.  Mar. 31, 1997.  One of the primary reasons 
for the CWW is the facilitation of business dealings within the PRC.  Id. 
19. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (to be codified in scattered sec-
tions of 47 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Telecom Act]. 
20. The First Amendment provides, in relevant part, “Congress shall make 
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
21. This hierarchy is based on the rationale that certain types of speech fos-
ter the values underlying the First Amendment—freedom of expression from 
regulation—more than others.  There is an ongoing debate regarding whether 
the language of the First Amendment merely prohibits the government from lim-
iting expression or whether it affirmatively requires the government to ensure 
that every citizen is afforded equal expression.  The First Amendment is tradi-
tionally viewed as prohibiting government from limiting freedom of expression. 
See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374 
(1996) (describing the values embodied by the First Amendment to include “an 
overarching commitment to protect speech from Government regulation”).  
Some of the most commonly recognized values underlying the First Amendment 
include the encouragement of a “marketplace of ideas” and rich public debate.  
The “marketplace of ideas” theory was first recognized by Justice Holmes in 
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919),  in which he described the market-
place of ideas concept as “the ultimate good desired is better reached by full 
trade in ideas—the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself ac-
cepted in the competition of the market.”  Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).  This 
principle, as well as Justice Holmes’ language, has been consistently cited in U.S. 
First Amendment jurisprudence.  See, e.g., FEC v. Mass Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 
U.S. 238, 257-59 (1986); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 
U.S. 530, 534 (1980), Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).  
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and therefore that none of them is going to question the va-
lidity of the First Amendment as a legal principle. 
The question regarding the First Amendment, then, is not 
whether First Amendment protection should exist, but 
rather how far it should extend.  Should First Amendment 
protection for the Internet be as extensive as that enjoyed by 
print,22 or should it be as limited as that enjoyed by broad-
cast?23  Currently, we do not have a model; should there be 
one? 
It is not clear how the Supreme Court will approach the 
                                                                                                                                  
For a comprehensive discussion of the historical developments of free speech 
and a discussion of its underlying values, see U. Lee Reed, Is Commercial Speech 
Really Less Valuable Than Political Speech?  On Relaxing Values and Categories in 
First Amendment jurisprudence, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 3-15 (1996). 
22. See supra note 1 (discussing the greater First Amendment protection af-
forded print media and the differing degrees of protection afforded the various 
communication media).  For example, while the government requires broadcast-
ers to provide free air time to those whom they criticize, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. 
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), the government does not require newspaper publish-
ers to print the replies of the persons criticized by the print media, Miami Herald 
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
23. The broadcast media enjoys the least amount of First Amendment pro-
tection within the communications industry, and thus is subject to the greatest 
regulation by the government. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) 
(“[O]f all the forms of communication, it is broadcasting that has received the 
most limited First Amendment protection.”); id. at 741 n.17 (“[I]t is well settled 
that the First Amendment has special meaning in the broadcasting context.”) (cit-
ing FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978); Red 
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); CBS v. Democratic Nat’l 
Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973)).  For a persuasive argument that broadcast media 
should be free of government regulation and should receive the same broad First 
Amendment protections as print media, see generally LUCAS A. POWE, JR., 
AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST Amendment (1988).  Two of the most 
commonly cited rationales for the lesser protection of the broadcast media are its 
“unique pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans,” Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 
748, and its unique accessibility to children without parental supervision or the 
ability to restrict the expression to adults, id. at 750.  Among the other reasons 
recognized for requiring greater regulation of the broadcast media are:  (1) radio 
receivers are in the home, a place where people’s privacy interest is entitled to 
extra deference, see Rowan v. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728 (1970); (2) unconsent-
ing adults may tune in a station without any warning that offensive language is 
being or will be broadcast; and (3) there is a scarcity of spectrum space, the use 
of which the government must therefore license in the public interest.  Pacifica, 
438 U.S. at 731 n.2. 
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issue of First Amendment protection on the Internet.  The 
Court has just barely touched upon the First Amendment 
model for cable television.24  We do not know how tradi-
tional controls over content, such as the body of tort law that 
embraces privacy and defamation, will apply to the Internet.  
Indeed, we do not even know if these principles are applica-
ble to, that is, if they make sense or are workable on, the 
Internet.  Finally, we do not know how much commercial 
speech is on the Internet and whether or not it makes sense 
to have a legal regime under which such speech enjoys more 
limited First Amendment protection, as it does in other me-
dia.25  All of these, and others, are open questions. 
The third and final topic that we will discuss is the Com-
munications Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA”),26 which is part of 
 
24. See Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (deciding 
that “[f]undamental technological differences between broadcast and cable tele-
vision transmission renders relaxed standard of scrutiny for broadcast regulation 
inapplicable to First Amendment challenge of cable regulation; cable television 
does not suffer from inherent limitations of broadcast television arising from 
scarcity of available broadcast frequencies compared to number of would-be 
broadcasters”). 
25. Commercial speech is “speech that advertise[s] a product or service for 
profit or for business purpose.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 271 (6th ed. 1990).  
Commercial speech is one of the least protected types of speech, and in fact was 
not afforded any protection until 1976.  See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).  In 1980, the Su-
preme Court formulated a four part test, which it continues to follow today, for 
determining the validity of a regulation restricting commercial speech.  See Cen-
tral Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).  If a 
the commercial speech at issue is truthful and not misleading, thus passing the 
threshold factor, the Court evaluates whether the government has a substantial 
interest in regulating the speech, whether the means of regulation further that 
interest, and whether are the regulation is no more restrictive than necessary to 
achieve its goal.  Id. at 564. 
26. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 502, 110 Stat. 56, 
133-36 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a)-(h) (West Supp. 1996)).  The CDA 
seeks to regulate the Internet and other interactive computer services with re-
gard to not only obscenity and child pornography, but also indecency.  Modeled 
after the federal dial-a-porn laws, the CDA is an attempt to keep indecent online 
materials from children.  Immediately after its passage, two pre-enforcement fa-
cial challenges to the CDA were brought in different courts.  Both lawsuits assert 
that the law violates the First and Fifth Amendments.  ACLU v. Reno; American 
Library Association v. United States Dep’t of Justice, Consolidated Nos. 96-963, 
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the Telecom Act.  Two lawyers on this panel are directly in-
volved in the constitutional challenge to the CDA that is cur-
rently before the Supreme Court, and the other panelists, I 
think, are familiar to very familiar with that case. 
The CDA, to oversimplify, prohibits obscene transmis-
sions on the Internet.27  “Obscene” is, what I would call and 
                                                                                                                                  
96-1458 (E.D. Pa.) and Shea v. Reno, 96 Civ. 976 (S.D.N.Y.).  The CDA provides 
that any facial constitutional challenge to the Act will be heard by a three-judge 
district court. Courts in both cases issued decisions preliminarily enjoining en-
forcement of the Act. 
The Act provides that any interlocutory or final judgment, decree holding 
any provision of the Act unconstitutional, shall be reviewable as a matter of right 
by direct appeal to the Supreme Court. On December 6, the Court noted prob-
able jurisdiction in the ACLU/ALA case, and later held the Shea case pending 
resolution of ACLU/ALA. 
27. Id. § 502(a)(1)(B) [hereinafter the “indecency provision] Section 
223(a)(1)(B), the “indecency provision,” subjects to a criminal fine and/or im-
prisonment of no more than two years, anyone:  
(1) in interstate or foreign communications . . . (B) by means of a tele-
communications device knowingly—(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and 
(ii) initiates the transmission of, any comment, request, suggestion, pro-
posal, image, or other communication which is obscene or indecent, 
knowing that the recipient of the communication is under 18 years of 
age, regardless of whether the maker of such communication placed the 
call or initiated the communication; . . . (2) knowingly permits any tele-
communications facility under his control to be used for any activity 
prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used for such ac-
tivity. 
47 U.S.C.A. § 233(a)(1)(B).  Although the Telecom Act does not define “telecom-
munications device,” the ACLU court agreed with its parties’ submission that the 
plain meaning and legislative history of the act supported the conclusion that a 
modem was included within this definition. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 829 n.5. 
The new Section 223(d) of 47 U.S.C. provides, in pertinent part:  (d) Who-
ever— 
(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly— 
(A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a spe-
cific person or persons under 18 years of age, or 
(B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a 
manner available to a person under 18 years of age, any com-
ment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communi-
cation that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently 
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, 
sexual or excretory activities or organs, regardless of whether 
the user of such service placed the call or initiated the commu-
nication; or 
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under such per-
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others have called, hardcore pornography.  Such material is 
outside the protection of the First Amendment, as the Su-
preme Court decided in Roth v. United States28 and Miller v. 
California.29  Therefore, the CDA’s provision prohibiting ob-
scenity is not a controversial aspect of the CDA.  Because ob-
scene transmissions are outside the protection of the First 
Amendment, it is unlikely that any of our panelists will ar-
gue that obscenity deserves First Amendment protection. 
The controversial parts of the CDA are a number of pro-
visions that deal with indecency on the Internet.30  To over-
simplify again, those provisions prohibit, and, in fact, im-
pose criminal sanctions on, the transmission of indecent 
material if it will get into the hands of minors.31  The CDA 
                                                                                                                                  
son’s control to be used for an activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with 
the intent that it be used for such activity, shall be fined under title 18, 
United States Code, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. 
47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d). 
28. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).  Roth was the first case in which the Supreme Court 
was forced to face the issue of whether or not the First Amendment protects ob-
scene materials.  Most importantly, the Court, in considering the constitutional-
ity of a statute criminalizing the mailing of obscene material, established its first 
test for determining whether or not material is obscene, asking “whether, to the 
average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant 
theme of the material, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest.” Id. at 
488-89. 
29. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).  In Miller, the Supreme Court revised its obscenity 
standard established in Roth by formulating a three-part test for identifying ob-
scene material:  
(a) whether the average person applying contemporary standards 
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient in-
terest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes in a patently offensive 
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; 
and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artis-
tic, political, or scientific value. 
413 U.S. at 24. 
30. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d)-(h).  The statute’s indecency provision fails to de-
fine the term indecency, and although the Supreme Court has not ruled on the 
issue, it has recognized the potential conflict.  ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 850-51 
(“Notwithstanding Congress’ familiarity with Pacifica, it enacted § 223(a), cover-
ing ‘indecent’ communications, without any language confining ‘indecent’ to 
descriptions or depictions of ‘sexual or excretory activities or organs,’ language 
it included in the reference to ‘patently offensive’ in § 223(d)(1)(B).”). 
31. The indecency provisions subject violators to criminal penalties of a 
maximum of two years imprisonment and/or a fine.  47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a); see 
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also provides certain defenses that we will probably touch 
on today as well.32 
The challenge to the CDA was brought by a number of 
interested parties.  The American Civil Liberties Union 
(“ACLU”) led one charge,33 and the American Library Asso-
ciation (“ALA”) led another.34  Those two cases were consoli-
dated and, last June, a three-judge panel in Philadelphia 
ruled that the CDA is unconstitutional.35  The case is now be-
fore the United States Supreme Court.36  The government 
filed its brief last month and the ACLU will file its brief to-
morrow. 
Now let me introduce our panelists.  David Pawlik is 
with the Communications Group at Skadden, Arps, Slate, 
Meagher & Flom in the firm’s Washington, D.C. office.  
David’s clients include Bell operating companies, wireless 
cable carriers, broadcasters, and firms that write and publish 
Internet software.  Before David entered law school, he spent 
twenty years in broadcasting and broadcast advertising. 
                                                                                                                                  
ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 849-50. 
32. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(e).  The statute explicitly recognizes various “safe har-
bor” defenses, including, inter alia,  individuals who merely provide Internet ac-
cess and do not create the offensive material, id. § 223(e)(1), mere employers of 
violators, id. § 223(e)(4), and those who in good faith attempt to prevent access to 
minors through “reasonable, effective, and appropriate means,” id. § 223(e)(5)(A), 
including “requiring the use of a verified credit card, debit account, adult access 
code, or adult personal identification number,” id. § 223(e)(5)(B). 
33. See Brief for Petitioner American Civil Liberties Union at 9, ACLU v. 
Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (No. 96-963) (consolidated with No. 96-
1458).  The ACLU filed its action the very day the CDA was signed into law, Feb-
ruary 8, 1996, moving for a temporary restraining order to enjoin enforcement of 
the CDA’s amendments to sections 223(a)(1)(B) (the “indecency provision”) and 
223(d)(1) (the “patently offensive provision”) of the Telecom Act. 
34. Brief for American Library Association, ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 
(E.D. Pa. 1996) (No. 96-1458) (consolidated with No. 96-963).  Soon after the 
ACLU, the ALA filed its action, which was substantially similar.  ACLU at 827-
28. 
35. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 858.  The Supreme Court heard oral argument on 
March 19, 1996. 1997 WL 136253 (U.S. Oral Argument—DIGEST). 
36. The Supreme Court heard oral argument on March 19, 1996. 1997 WL 
136253 (U.S. Oral Argument—DIGEST). 
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Preeta Bansal is a lawyer with a broad background in 
communications issues.  She is currently at the New York of-
fice of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, where she is a litigator spe-
cializing in libel, copyright, and constitutional issues.  Before 
she joined Gibson, Dunn, Preeta served in the Clinton Ad-
ministration as Special Counsel to the Office of White House 
Counsel working on litigation matters and Supreme Court 
nominations.  She also worked as a counselor to the Assis-
tant Attorney General in the Antitrust Division of the De-
partment of Justice, where she coordinated policy and litiga-
tion matters involving intellectual property, high-technology 
network industries, and international enforcement.  She su-
pervised the antitrust investigation of Microsoft, and was 
also involved in issues relating to violence on television.  Be-
fore government service, Preeta was in private practice 
where she worked on the “must carry” cable television litiga-
tion, which concluded in the Supreme Court in the Turner37 
case. 
Chris Hansen has had a long and distinguished career as 
a public interest lawyer.  Chris is currently Senior Staff 
Counsel at the ACLU.  He has been with the ACLU for the 
past twelve years, first as Special Litigation Counsel, then as 
Associate Director of the Children’s Rights Project, and since 
1993 in his present position as Senior Staff Counsel.  Before 
joining the ACLU, Chris was with the New York Civil Liber-
ties Union for four years.  He was also Director of the Mental 
Patients’ Rights Project, and was an attorney for the Mental 
Health Law Project and the Legal Aid Society of New York.  
Chris is an active speaker, legal scholar, and author, and has 
taught at Hofstra Law School as an Adjunct Professor.  
Among the many litigations in which Chris has been in-
volved are cases concerning mental health, children’s rights, 
and a broad array of constitutional cases, including some 
important desegregation cases and many First Amendment 
 
37. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994). 
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cases. 
Chris is presently involved in four cases concerning First 
Amendment issues on the Internet.  One of those cases is the 
case upon which this panel will focus today, ACLU v. Reno,38 
which, as I said, challenges the CDA on constitutional 
grounds.  Chris argued that case last year on behalf of the 
ACLU and its co-plaintiffs before the three-judge panel that 
ruled in his favor.39  He is actively involved in the appeal 
now pending before the Supreme Court.40 
Ted Hirt is a lawyer with the Department of Justice 
where he specializes in constitutional issues.  Ted is the As-
sistant Branch Director of the Federal Programs Branch of 
Justice, which is the branch that defends the constitutionality 
of federal statutes.  That branch is involved in issues ranging 
from the Brady gun control law,41 which involves both Sec-
ond and Tenth Amendment constitutional issues, and a wide 
array of First Amendment issues.  One of Ted’s primary spe-
cialties is telecommunications issues, especially First 
Amendment work.  Ted is the author of several articles on 
constitutional issues, including First Amendment matters 
and litigation practices.42  He has participated in the De-
partment of Justice training program on the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, discovery in pretrial practice, and financial 
institutions regulation.  Finally, Ted supervised the govern-
 
38. 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa.), prob. juris. noted, 117 S. Ct. 554 (1996). 
39. Id. at 833 (holding the CDA unconstitutional). 
40.  The Supreme Court heard oral argument on March 19, 1997.  ACLU v. 
Reno:  A Chronology (visited June 9, 1997) 
<http://www.aclu.org/news/n050896.htm/>.  For a transcript of the oral ar-
gument, see 1997 WL 136253. 
41. Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 
1536 (1993) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 925A (1994)) (establishing a national com-
puter system for instant checks of information on criminal backgrounds of poten-
tial gun purchasers to be made operational for use by gun sellers within five 
years). 
42. See, e.g., Theodore C. Hirt, “Symbolic Union” of Church and State and the 
“Endorsement” of Sectarian Activity:  A Critique of Unwieldy Tools of Establishment 
Clause Jurisprudence, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 823 (1989). 
   
478 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [7:463 
ment attorneys involved in ACLU v. Reno. 
Last, but not least, is Parry Aftab.  Parry is a cyberspace 
and technology law expert.  She is a partner of Aftab & 
Savitt, a Paramus, New Jersey law firm that has been recog-
nized for its innovative practice using technology.  You can 
reach its Web site at <www.aftab.com>.  Parry is also the 
founder of the Virtual Law Firm Network, which is a net-
work of lawyers that operates somewhat in the manner of a 
large firm but is organized through cyberspace.43  The net-
work has specialists in international and United States tax 
law, environmental law, regulatory law, trusts and estates 
law, and criminal matters.44  Parry is also the host of Amer-
ica Online’s Legal Information Network discussion board 
and Court TV Law Center’s Legal Help Line.  Finally, Parry 
created and runs Law Talk, which is a legal discussion fo-
rum on the Women’s Interest Board on America Online. 
Those are our panelists.  I thank you all for joining us.  I 
would now like to ask Dave Pawlik to begin with the open-
ing statement. 
MR. PAWLIK:  Thank you.  I first want to say that I am 
here substituting for Toni Cook Bush, who sends her apolo-
gies. 
The Internet has been called “an untrammelled, uncon-
trolled, wholly liberated ocean of information” and “a great 
egalitarian town meeting.”45  Considering the vastness of its 
libraries and files, and the diversity of its contributors, it is 
no wonder that this ocean contains not only the waves of art, 
literature, and information, but also less edifying artifacts 
 
43. See Aftab & Savitt, P.C., The Virtual Law Network (VLFN) (visited Apr. 20, 
1997) <http://aftab.com/vlfnet.htmvlfn/>; Parry Aftab, Sophistication Not Size 
Matters, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 18, 1996, at 40. 
44. See, e.g., Karen Mills, Investing in Indonesia (visited Apr. 20, 1997) 
<http://aftab.com/millsart.htm> (supplying an article written by VLFN’s Indo-
nesian member). 
45. Quotation from The Spectator, Feb. 4, 1995, reprinted in 141 CONG. REC. 
S9018 (daily ed. June 26, 1995) (statement of Sen. Grassley). 
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lurking deep in its darkness.  This variety becomes a prob-
lem only because this ocean is frequently “surfed” by our 
children, who, in many families, are the most computer-
literate members of the household. 
Senator Exon warned us that the Internet was filled with 
dark places.46  He compiled examples of what was available 
for downloading and displayed the resulting collection of 
pornography in his famous “blue book.”47  Senator Grassley 
amplified Congress’ concern by citing a Carnegie Mellon 
study that was subsequently published in the Georgetown 
Law Review48 and was the subject of a Time magazine cover 
story.49  Although the Carnegie Mellon study has been criti-
 
46. “[The Internet] is a great boon to mankind.  But we should not ignore the 
dark roads of pornography, indecency and obscenity it makes possible.”  Sen. 
Exon, Letter to the Editor, WASH. POST., Dec. 2, 1995, at A20.  See also 141 CONG. 
REC. S8089 (daily ed. June 9, 1995) (statement of Sen. Exon) (discussing the pleth-
ora of pornography available on the Internet and expressing concern for chil-
dren’s exposure to such material).  Upon his initial introduction of the CDA on 
February 1, 1995, Senator Exon warned that without the passage of his legisla-
tion, the information superhighway would become a red light district.  141 
CONG. REC. S1953 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1995).  
47. Id.  Senator Exon included some of the “rawer” Internet images in a blue 
folder and invited his colleagues to view them at his desk.  Id.  The pictures in 
the folder “made Playboy and Hustler look like Sunday-school stuff.”  Id.  The 
bill passed 84 to 16, many say because “[a]t the end of the debate—which was 
carried live on c-span—few Senators wanted to cast a nationally televised vote 
that might later be characterized as pro-pornography. 
48. Marty Rimm, Marketing Pornography on the Information Superhighway:  A 
Survey of 917,410 Images, Descriptions, Short Stories, and Animations Downloaded 8.5 
Million Times by Consumers in Over 2000 Cities in Forty Countries, Provinces, and 
Territories, 83 GEO. L.J. 1849 (1995). 
49. Philip Elmer-DeWitt, On a Screen Near You:  Cyberporn, TIME, July 3, 1995, 
at 38, reprinted in 141 CONG. REC. S9017-02.  The Carnegie Mellon study, entitled 
Marketing Pornography on the Information Superhighway, reported the results 
of a team who surveyed 917,410 sexually explicit pictures, descriptions, short 
stories, and film clips over an 18 month period.  141 CONG. REC. at S9019.  One of 
the most amazing and most often cited findings of the report was that 83.5% of 
the pictures on Usenet groups where digitized images are stored are porno-
graphic.  Id.  Many of the images are of things that cannot be found in common 
pornographic materials (though most pictures are scanned from existing photo-
graphs):  “pedophilia (nude photos of children), hebephilia (youths) and 
paraphilia—a grab bag of deviant material that includes images of bondage, sa-
domasochism, urination, defecation, and sex acts with a barnyard full of ani-
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cized50 and the Time story may have misinterpreted the 
study,51 the resulting concern in Congress and in homes 
across the nation gave us the CDA—new regulation in a de-
regulatory era. 
Senator Leahy, with support from Senators Levin, Biden, 
and Feingold, led the opposition to the CDA.52  Even 
Speaker Gingrich, who proudly introduced the House of 
Representatives’ Internet-based system, “Thomas,”53 com-
mented that the CDA was a violation of free speech.54  The 
National Telecommunications and Information Administra-
tion, the Justice Department, and the Chairman of the FCC 
also joined the opposition to the CDA.55  In the end, the 
CDA’s opposition was ineffective.  Its passage was guaran-
teed by both lawmakers’ fears of appearing to favor pornog-
raphy in an election year and the overwhelming popularity 
of the Telecom Act to which the CDA was attached. 
There is no question that pornography exists on the 
Internet.  Even the staunchest supporters of Internet freedom 
                                                                                                                                  
mals.”  Id.  The study does point out that “pornographic image files, despite their 
evident popularity, represent only about 3 percent of all the messages on the 
Usenet newsgroups, while the Usenet itself represents only 11.5 percent of the 
traffic on the Internet.  Id. 
50. See, e.g., Robert Cannon, The Legislative History of Senator Exon’s Commu-
nications Decency Act:  Regulating the Barbarians on the Information Superhighway, 49 
FED. COMM. L.J. 51, 53-57 (1996) (discussing common criticisms of the Rimm 
study, including its methodology and lack of peer review); Donna L. Hoffman & 
Thomas P. Novak, A Detailed Analysis of the Conceptual, Logical, and Meth-
odological Flaws in the article, Marketing Pornography on the Information Super-
highway (version 1.01, July 2, 1995) 
<http://www2000.ogsm.vanderbilt.edu/rimm.cgi>. 
51. See Hoffman & Novak, A Detailed Critique of the Time Article:  “On a 
Screen Near You:  Cyberporn” (1995) (visited Apr. 16, 1997) 
<http://www.hotwired.com/spe-cial/pornscare/hoffman.html>. 
52. Cannon, supra note 50, at 65. 
53. Thomas (visited June 9, 1997) <http://www.thomas.gov>. The Thomas 
site was named for Thomas Jefferson.  Id. 
54. See Cannon, supra note 51, at 67.  Denouncing the Exon amendment, 
House speaker Newt Gingrich stated:  “It is clearly a violation of free speech and 
it’s a violation of the right of adults to communicate with each other.”  141 CONG. 
REC. S9017-02, at S9020. 
55. Canon, supra note 51, at 69-70. 
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will generally concede that some material on the Internet 
may be harmful to children.  The challenge presented to 
Congress, therefore, was how to address this situation with-
out infringing on the First Amendment rights of adult Inter-
net users. 
The nature of the Internet makes its regulation a monu-
mental task.  There is no Internet “headquarters” with opera-
tional control to assure that only appropriate material is 
provided to children.  Nor is there a bank of data libraries 
where material can be marked as “child-friendly.”  Indeed, 
the Internet is the epitome of widely-distributed information 
processing and storage technologies.  It is a “network of 
networks”56 designed to be self-healing.  In the event that 
any link between its sites is broken, the network will route 
information around the break using self-maintaining redun-
dant links without any human intervention.57 
Censorship would be treated as just another break to be 
worked around.  For example, if every file that could be con-
sidered indecent were somehow purged from every U.S. 
Internet server, the same material could find its way right 
back into the Internet from an overseas source with hardly a 
noticeable lag in search and retrieval time. 
 
56. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 830 (“The Internet is not a physical or tangible en-
tity but rather a giant network which interconnects innumerable smaller groups 
of linked computer networks.  It is thus a network of networks.”). 
57. Id. at 831-32 (stating that the Internet was designed to be a “decentral-
ized, self-maintaining series of redundant links between computers and com-
puter networks, capable of rapidly transmitting communications without direct 
human involvement or control, and with the automatic ability to re-route com-
munications if one or more individual links were damaged or otherwise unavail-
able [particularly if the] network were damaged, say, in a war.”).  For example, a 
computer message traveling from Washington to Baltimore that encounters bro-
ken or busy links on the most direct path may be automatically routed from 
Washington to Chicago to New York to Baltimore without a meaningful delay or 
without either the sender or receiver becoming aware of the rerouting.  ED KROL, 
THE WHOLE INTERNET:  USER’S GUIDE & CATALOG, 20-23 (3d ed. 1993); see also 
ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 831 (“A communication sent over this redundant series of 
linked computers could travel any of a number of routes to its destination.”). 
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The use of the Internet has grown widely and rapidly to 
the point where its use is shared by adults and children of all 
ages for business, for education, and for pleasure.58  Internet 
users from around the world may access Web sites, chat 
rooms, bulletin boards, and other Net locations created and 
supported by commercial entities, educational institutions, 
and even private individuals.59  Material that many may 
consider to be pornographic can be found in all forms at 
each of these types of Internet locations.  What is more, 
Internet material may be stored and accessed with a degree 
of anonymity that would make Joe Klein60 envious. 
Notwithstanding the practical considerations of regulat-
ing Internet content, the First Amendment issues are equally 
imposing.  The CDA seeks to protect children from indecent 
material.  Rather than invent a new “harmful to children” 
standard or redefine “indecency,” Congress adopted the 
definition of indecency used by the Supreme Court in 
Pacifica,61 the case involving George Carlin’s “Seven Dirty 
 
58. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text (estimating the current and 
projected numbers of Internet users).  Although the Internet has existed for al-
most 30 years, it has gained popularity only in the past five years.  ACLU, 929 F. 
Supp. at 831.  For a comprehensive discussion of the origins and development of 
the Internet, see HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY:  HOMESTEADING 
ON THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 65-70 (1993).  While the Internet was used almost 
exclusively by researchers in government and at educational institutions, it has 
changed dramatically in a short period of time, as both the types of persons who 
use the Internet and the purposes for which they use it have expanded tremen-
dously.  Id. 
59. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(a) (West Supp. 1996) (setting forth findings of Con-
gress regarding the growth, use, and benefits of the Internet and other interactive 
computer services); see also ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 832-34 (noting the increased 
variety of means through which individuals can access the Internet, including 
educational institutions, corporations and other employers, free local community 
networks, libraries, coffee shops, commercial and noncommercial Internet ser-
vice providers, online services, or bulletin board systems). 
60. Joe Klein is the author of the best-selling novel, Primary Colors, published 
under the pseudonym of “Anonymous.”  The public curiosity surrounding the 
identity of the author was great, and  Joe Klein was discovered by the press to be 
the true author only after much investigation. 
61. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
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Words You Can’t Say on TV” monologue.62  Pacifica, and 
subsequently the CDA, define indecency as:  
[A]ny comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or 
other communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in 
terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary 
community standards, sexual or excretory activities or or-
gans . . . .63 
The CDA contains two principal prohibitions.  The first 
provision makes it a criminal act to send an indecent mes-
sage to a specific person or persons under the age of eight-
een.64  Although prohibiting communications directed spe-
cifically at children would be difficult to detect and 
prosecute.  The provision seems at first glance to be reason-
able and narrowly tailored to prohibit conduct that is repre-
hensible to most Americans.65  However, the legal definition 
of “indecency” under the CDA also would include works of 
art and literature that may be important to the education of a 
 
62. The transcript of Mr. Carlin’s monologue is reprinted verbatim in an ap-
pendix to Pacifica. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 751; ACLU, American Civil Liberties Un-
ion, Freedom Network (visited Apr. 16, 1997) <http://www.aclu.org>.  For a dis-
cussion of how George Carlin’s monologue might be treated on the Internet, see 
generally Stacey J. Rappaport, Rules of the Road:  The Constitutional Limits of Re-
stricting Indecent Speech on the Information Superhighway, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 301 (1995). 
63. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d)(1)(B); 438 U.S. at 752. 
64. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d)(1)(A); see supra note 27 (setting forth statutory lan-
guage). 
65. When the government attempts to regulate speech based on its content, 
the regulation is subject “strict scrutiny.”  Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460-62 
(1980).  The regulation must be “necessary to serve a compelling state interest 
and [be] narrowly drawn to achieve that end.”  Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 
270 (1981).  Alternatively, if the regulation is not based on the speech’s content, it 
will receive intermediate scrutiny wherein it will be deemed constitutional if it 
furthers an “important or substantial” government interest and is no greater than 
is essential.”  United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 263, 270 (1981).  The lowest level 
of protection is afforded to, among other categories of speech, indecent speech, 
wherein the government must simply have a valid or legitimate purpose for 
regulating the speech and the regulation must be merely “rationally related” to 
limiting the speech.  See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-54 
(1938). 
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sixteen- or seventeen-year-old.66 
The CDA’s second prohibition makes it a crime to post 
anything indecent on the Internet where a minor might have 
access to it.67  This is the most controversial portion of the 
CDA because it holds the strongest threat to First Amend-
ment freedoms.  The CDA’s definition of indecency causes 
controversy as well, as its reference to “contemporary com-
munity standards”68 begs the question of what community a 
court should look to.  Should it look to the community of the 
person who posts material on the Internet or the community 
of the person who downloads material from the Internet?  
Or perhaps the Internet itself is an electronic community 
without a geographic location. 
The current standard for determining the community re-
garding the interstate transport of materials is to use the 
community standards of the geographic area where the ma-
terial is sent—that is, where the message is downloaded.69  
Last year, this standard was upheld on appeal in the highly 
publicized case United States v. Thomas,70 in which electronic 
images were transmitted, from computer to computer over 
phone lines, not using the Internet.71  The defendant, Tho-
mas, allowed a customer in Tennessee to download photo-
graphs from Thomas’ California computer.  Thomas, the 
ACLU, and other amici argued that computer technology re-
 
66. See supra note 30 (indicating that the CDA does not explicitly define in-
decency). 
67. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d)(1)(B); see supra note 27 (setting forth statutory lan-
guage). 
68. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1460-1469 (West Supp. 1996) (codifying the judicially 
created doctrine in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957), which judges 
indecency according to contemporary community standards). 
69. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 106 (1974) (deeming constitu-
tional the judging of contemporary community standards according to local 
community standards where obscene mail violating obscenity statute is transmit-
ted); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30-34 (1973) (declining to require a national 
standard in evaluating “contemporary community standards” and stating that 
local standards should control). 
70. 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 74 (1996). 
71. Thomas, 74 F.3d at 710. 
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quires a new definition of community—one based on cyber-
space.72  The court disagreed, and instead found that Tho-
mas knew the location of the person downloading material 
from his computer, and stated that, if he did not want to 
abide by Tennessee community standards, he could have re-
frained from selling access to his computer images to a Ten-
nessee resident.73 
If this same rationale is applied to information posted on 
the Internet, the standards of the most conservative commu-
nity in the United States could be applied to every item 
posted on the Internet.  Thomas dealt with a private, dial-in 
computer bulletin board, not the Internet.74  If Thomas had 
posted his material to a free, public Usenet75 bulletin board, 
or had incorporated it into a Web page that was available to 
anonymous users, he would have had no knowledge of the 
communities in which his material was being downloaded.  
The court’s admonition to choose an audience with commu-
nity standards in mind could not apply to a large portion of 
the Internet.76  If the Internet user cannot determine which 
community standard is applicable, he will be motivated, by 
fear of criminal penalties, to steer far away from anything 
that could be found to be unpalatable in the most conserva-
tive of communities.  The chilling effect this would have on 
the exercise of free speech is obvious.77 
 
72. Id. at 711. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 704. 
75. The Usenet is a user-sponsored newsgroup, also known as a distributed 
message database. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 834.  Usenet groups are similar to 
listservs, see supra note 195 and accompanying text, in that they are “open dis-
cussions and exchanges on particular topics.”  Id. at 835.  Unlike listservs, and 
more similar to “bulletin boards,” see supra note 171, Usenet newsgroups can be 
accessed at any time, without needing to subscribe.  ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 835.  
Usenet actually predates the Internet, but today, the Internet is used to transfer 
much of Usenet’s traffic.  See ED HOHL, THE WHOLE INTERNET SM (2d ed. 1994). 
76. Id. at 711. 
77. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 851 (agreeing with plaintiffs and declaring 
that “the challenged provisions, if not enjoined, will have a chilling effect on 
[speakers’] free expression”). 
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As the Court recognized in Pacifica, indecent material, 
unlike obscene material, is protected by the First Amend-
ment.78  Children may be protected from indecent material 
by measures that seek to channel such material to protect 
children from exposure to it, while not absolutely banning 
the material for adults.79  To withstand a constitutional chal-
lenge, a law curbing indecent material must be narrowly 
drawn to serve the interests of protecting children.  Law-
makers must choose the least restrictive means to further the 
government’s interest.80 
In Sable, the Supreme Court case involving “dial-a-porn” 
services, the Court noted that First Amendment protection 
and the type of channeling that may be permitted for inde-
cent material depends upon the attributes of the medium 
through which the material is presented.81  For instance, the 
Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision in Butler v. Michi-
gan,82 held unconstitutional a law restricting the public’s ac-
cess to certain books in order to shield juvenile innocence.  
The Court commented that such a law effectively “burn[ed] 
the house to roast the pig.”83  According to the Court, other 
less restrictive means, such as permitting sales to adults 
only, would have satisfied the government’s interest without 
unduly restricting the rights of adults to access materials 
protected by the First Amendment.84   
 
78. 438 U.S. at 746.  “Obscenity” may be thought of as “indecency” that:  (1) 
appeals to prurient interests, and (2) 
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific merit.  Id. at 739-42.  The sec-
ond of these factors is commonly referred to as the SLAPS test.  See infra note 113 
and accompanying text. 
79. Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127 (1989) (holding 
unconstitutional a ban on the interstate transmission of indecent commercial 
telephone messages). 
80. Id.; see also supra note 66 (explaining the least restrictive means require-
ment). 
81. Id. 
82. 352 U.S. 380 (1957). 
83. Id. at 383. 
84. Id. at 384. 
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Pacifica involved the “uniquely pervasive” presence of 
broadcasting in the home and the accessibility of broadcast-
ing to children.85  Even a child who cannot read could have 
his vocabulary significantly enlarged by listening to George 
Carlin’s monologue.86  The constitutionally sound solution 
was to channel indecent material to hours of the broadcast 
day when children are not likely to be present in the audi-
ence.87  The Court also noted that outside of the home the 
balance between the First Amendment rights of a speaker 
and those of a listener tips in favor of the speaker, requiring 
an offended listener just to turn away, as in the case of a 
drive-in movie showing indecent films.88 
The Supreme Court has previously declined to adopt the 
broadcast model for cable television because of what it refers 
to as fundamental technological differences.89  But, more re-
cently, cable has been found to have established a uniquely 
pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans, and there-
fore to be as accessible to children as over-the-air broadcast-
ing, if not more so.90  Last year, a three-judge panel found 
that the Telecom Act’s provisions restricting the carriage of 
sexually explicit or indecent programming91 were narrowly 
 
85. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49. 
86. Id. at 749 (“Pacifica’s broadcast could have enlarged a child’s vocabulary 
in an instant.”). 
87. Id. at 733. 
88. Id. at 749 n.27 (citing Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975)). 
89. See Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (deciding 
that “[f]undamental technological differences between broadcast and cable tele-
vision transmission renders relaxed standard of scrutiny for broadcast regulation 
inapplicable to First Amendment challenge of cable regulation; cable television 
does not suffer from inherent limitations of broadcast television arising from 
scarcity of available broadcast frequencies compared to number of would-be 
broadcasters”). 
90. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 
2374, 2386 (1996). 
91. Referring to Section 505 of the CDA, Title V of the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, cited in Playboy Entert. Group, Inc. 
v. United States, 945 F. Supp. 772, 774 (D. Del. 1996). 
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tailored and passed First Amendment scrutiny.92  The Tele-
com Act requires cable programming distributors to either 
fully scramble both the audio and video portions of channels 
containing indecent material93 or channel the indecent pro-
gramming to times when children are not likely to be pre-
sent in the audience.94 
But, at least for now, the Internet is not as pervasive or 
prevalent in American homes as broadcast television or ca-
ble.  Furthermore, unlike watching television, using the 
Internet is an active, rather than a passive, function. 
Accessing the Internet may be compared to using the 
public switched telephone network for private commercial 
telephone communications.  In Sable, dial-a-porn services 
were held to be substantially different from broadcasting.95  
In contrast to television viewing, where the Court found that 
the public has no meaningful opportunity to avoid contact 
with indecent material,96 the dial-in situation requires a lis-
tener to take affirmative steps to receive a communication.97  
Credit cards and access codes were determined to be accept-
able channeling mechanisms capable of protecting children 
from indecent phone messages.98  An absolute ban on inde-
cent phone messages cannot be justified by speculation that 
enterprising youngsters can and will evade the rules and 
gain access to phone sex services.99 
So, the next question is what model should be used for 
Internet material.  The Internet is not a passive medium.  It 
requires loading software, establishing an account and a 
connection, and actively searching for materials.  Addition-
 
92. Playboy Entert. Group, Inc. v. United States, 945 F. Supp. 772 (D. Del. 
1996). 
93. 47 U.S.C.A. § 561(a) (West Supp. 1996). 
94. 47 U.S.C.A. § 561(b) (West Supp. 1996). 
95. 497 U.S. at 127. 
96.  Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 121. 
99. Id. at 129. 
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ally, downloading, decoding, and viewing material of the 
type in Senator Exon’s blue book takes some degree of com-
puter expertise—although such expertise is well within the 
grasp of a computer literate twelve-year-old.  If the Sable 
model is chosen, indecent materials may not be prohibited, 
but some reasonable means of attempting to determine the 
age of a user may be required as a method of channeling in-
decent material toward adults.  Even if the Pacifica broad-
cast/cable model is adopted, the First Amendment requires 
channeling rather than the complete elimination of indecent 
material. 
Channeling on the Internet, however, may well be im-
possible.  Time channeling will not work because computer 
file servers are available for access at all hours, not to men-
tion the fact that, with a network that spans the globe, it is 
always midnight somewhere.  Certain commercial sites with 
adult-oriented material require credit cards or age verifica-
tion services,100 which themselves use credit cards, for ac-
cess.  This is no solution, however, for the vast Usenet collec-
tion of bulletin boards available without additional charge 
beyond that required for access to the net. 
Commercial services, such as AOL, provide software 
screening mechanisms for parental supervision of access to 
certain Internet areas.101  But the software is not foolproof 
 
100. An Age Verification service, such as 18 Plus, Adult Check, and iSheild, 
requires a subscriber to provide personal information, primarily credit card in-
formation. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 839-42.  The Age Verification system operator 
purportedly checks the validity of the credit card (by charging an annual fee, 
usually less than $10, to the card) and issues a password/ID number, which can 
then be used to gain access to the web pages “protected” by the Age Verification 
system. Id. 
101. Id. at 839.  Examples of screening software designed to limit children’s 
access to the Internet include CyberPatrol, CYBERsitter, The Internet Filter, Net 
Nanny, Parental Guidance, SurfWatch, Netscape Proxy Server, and WebTrack.  
Id.  The competition among the software companies is greatly increasing as the 
market for such software rapidly expands. ACLU, 929 F. Supp at 839.  Net Nanny 
is one type of age verification software that is designed to allow those concerned 
to filter unwanted material on the Internet.  Id.  For an explanation of the differ-
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and can be bypassed by curious and ingenious children.  
Other programs, like Net Nanny, Cyber Patrol,102 and 
SurfWatch,103 operate through the use of databases contain-
ing lists of sites with indecent material.  With new sites 
added every day, however, these programs have obvious 
flaws.  The World Wide Web Consortium, a group of soft-
ware and service companies active in the Internet, has de-
veloped a set of technical specifications that permit filtering 
software to screen out Web pages containing certain types of 
material.  This system, the Platform for Internet Content Se-
lection (“PICS”),104 can be used either for self-rating by 
Internet publishers, or by independent rating agencies.105  
These software solutions show promise, and because they do 
not involve government action—even though some of them 
were prompted by the CDA—they do not present First 
Amendment problems. 
So, the problem of Internet pornography definitely exists 
as a threat to the welfare of our children.  Nonetheless, the 
CDA is not without its own problems as a threat to free 
speech on the Internet.  The Supreme Court is presented 
with an intriguing and important case, ably argued by both 
                                                                                                                                  
ent types of age verification systems, see id. 
102. Cyber Patrol, manufactured by Microsystems Software, Inc., was one of 
the first software packages, introduced in August 1995, designed to “give parents 
the comfort that their children can reap the benefits of the Internet while shield-
ing them from objectionable or otherwise inappropriate materials based on the 
parent’s own particular tastes and values.” Id. at 839-40.  Cyber Patrol’s slogan is 
“to Surf and Protect.” See Microsystems Software Website, (visited Apr. 20, 1997) 
<http://www.microsys.com/ cyber/default.htm>; see also Cyber Patrol by MSI 
“To Surf and Protect” (visited Apr. 20, 1997) 
<http://www.cybernothing.org/jdtalk/media-coverage/archive/msgD3082. 
html>. 
103. SurfWatch is another type of age verification system. ACLU, 929 F. 
Supp. at 841 (detailing the availability of SurfWatch software). 
104. The PICS program was initiated by the World Wide Web Consortium 
to “develop technical standards that would support parents’ ability to filter and 
screen material that their children see on the Web.”  ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 838.  
PICS, when complete, will provide ratings for Web sites, facilitating parents’ 
ability to filter what their children are exposed to on the Internet.  Id. 
105. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 839; W3C, Platform for Internet Content Selec-
tion (PICS) (visited Apr. 16, 1997) <http://www.w3.org/pub/WWW/PICS/>. 
 1997] SYMPOSIUM⎯CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CDA 491 
sides.  We can speculate on what the ramifications of the 
Court’s decision might be. 
If the CDA is found to be unconstitutional, parents will 
continue to seek methods of protecting their children when 
they themselves are not available to supervise their chil-
dren’s Internet use.  We can expect commercial services, 
such as AOL, to strengthen and to promote their internal fil-
tering mechanisms.  We can also expect new “all-kid” or 
family oriented online services to develop.  The protection 
from indecent material offered by such services would pro-
vide a clear advantage to accessing the Internet through 
them, as opposed to direct connection through Internet ser-
vice providers.  Additionally, software programs will prolif-
erate both as add-ins to browsers,106 like Netscape Naviga-
tor, and as stand-alone products.  Many companies will take 
advantage of the PICS system.  Parents may find that they 
have to pay more attention to what their kids are doing on 
their computers.  They may also need to initiate some frank 
family discussions about the materials that are out there and 
how a responsible child should handle such material when it 
appears. 
On the other hand, if the CDA is upheld, credit card au-
thentication and Age Verification systems will flourish on 
the Internet because they represent a viable method of pro-
tecting Internet publishers from criminal liability.107  Free 
Web pages originating in the United States will be severely 
 
106. A web browser provides the user with Internet access to both topical 
directories and search engines.  Eugene Volokh, Law and Computers:  Computer 
Media for the Legal Profession, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2058, 2064 (1996); see also Carl Op-
pedahl, Analysis and Suggestions Regarding NSI Domain Name Trademark Dispute 
Policy, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 73, 97 n.73 (1996). 
107. But see ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 845 (“There is no effective way to deter-
mine the identity or age of a user who is accessing material through e-mail, mail 
exploders, newsgroups or chat rooms. . . . For these reasons, there is no reliable 
way for a sender to know if the e-mail recipient is an adult or minor.”); ACLU, 
929 F. Supp. at 846 (“Verification of a credit card over the Internet is not now 
technically possible.”). 
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curtailed in content, primarily through self-censorship by 
Internet publishers who do not want to risk running afoul of 
the community standard of the most socially conservative 
community in the nation.  We can expect to see some infor-
mal contests to determine which community will hold that 
title.  The old question, “Will it play in Peoria?” may become 
the motto of Internet publishers. 
Additionally, foreign Usenet servers, bulletin boards, and 
Web servers will flourish because the interest in sexually 
oriented material will not evaporate; it will merely migrate 
overseas.108  State legislators will be eager to adopt their own 
versions of the CDA, as protecting children and fighting 
pornographers are popular causes that may be expected to 
attract votes and campaign contributions. 
The recent revision to New York’s Penal Code is an ex-
ample of the kind of state statute we can expect more of if 
the CDA is upheld.109  The New York statute adds a “harm-
ful to minors” standard to the “indecency” standard used in 
the CDA.110  The statute also provides an exception, similar 
to the Supreme Court’s “SLAPS” test,111 for persons with sci-
entific, educational, governmental, or other similar justifica-
tion for possessing disseminating, or viewing the material.112  
These two provisions of the New York statute adjust the fo-
cus of the law to material that is perhaps less deserving of 
protection than the Pacifica definition of “indecency,” but, 
 
108. See Peter Johnson, Pornography Drives Technology:  Why Not to Censor the 
Internet, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 217 (1996). 
109. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.20-24 (McKinney 1996). 
110. Id. § 235.20(6) (McKinney 1996). 
111. SLAPS is an acronym for Serious Literary, Artistic, Political, or Scien-
tific merit. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).  The Supreme Court has 
held that a state obscenity offense must be limited to works which, taken as a 
whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a 
patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have “serious liter-
ary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” Id. 
112. See Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 465-66 (1966) (finding that a 
court can take into consideration the setting in which the publication was pre-
sented “as an aid to determining the question of obscenity”). 
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because of its focus on minors rather than the general popu-
lation, does not reach the level of obscenity.  New York’s 
community standard for determining what is suitable for 
minors is the “adult community as a whole.”113  The New 
York statute also has a provision criminalizing the use of the 
Internet to importune, invite, or induce a minor to engage in 
sexual activity.114  Because this prohibition is specific and not 
tied to merely publishing material protected by the First 
Amendment, it could be severed from the remainder of the 
statute and survive scrutiny.  Accordingly, even if the CDA 
were to be struck down, at least part of the New York statute 
has a chance of surviving. 
Attempting to censor the Internet is a monumental chal-
lenge; it may be impossible to accomplish.  Censoring the 
Internet without trampling the First Amendment adds an-
other dimension to the problem.  When all is said and done, 
the ultimate solution will be to recognize the Internet for 
what it is:  an unparalleled educational resource,115 the most 
participatory marketplace of mass speech that the world has 
yet seen,116 and an opportunity for diverse, frank, and uplift-
ing discussion about all aspects of human existence.117 
At the heart of the First Amendment is the principle that 
each person should decide the ideas and beliefs deserving of 
expression, consideration, and adherence.118  Our political 
system and cultural life rest upon this ideal.  The Internet 
has evolved as it has because it has been free of content-
based considerations.119  There is a time when, and a place 
where, censorship must be replaced with our responsibility 
 
113. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235-20(6)(a). 
114. Id. at § 235-21(3). 
115. Brief for the Appellants, Department of Justice, before the U. S. Su-
preme Court in Reno v. ACLU, 96-511, at 14-15 (1997).   
116. ACLU, 928 F. Supp. at 881. 
117. See Carlin Meyer, Reclaiming Sex from the Pornographers:  Cybersexual 
Possibilities, 83 GEO. L.J. 1969 (1995). 
118. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 881. 
119. Id. at 877. 
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as parents to raise our children to decide for themselves 
what is right and what is wrong, and to make informed and 
confident choices from among the waves of material that 
will come crashing over them—today from the Internet and 
tomorrow from sources we can hardly imagine. 
Thank you. 
MR. JOLLYMORE:  Thank you very much, Dave.  Now, 
to shift our perspective a little and add to the complexity of 
the issues, Preeta Bansal will talk about cyberspace, the 
Internet, and the law of libel and the First Amendment. 
MS. BANSAL:  I thought I would just briefly sketch, in 
outline form, some of the other areas in which the Internet is 
affecting First Amendment jurisprudence. 
In the last few years, we have heard a lot about cyber-
space, cyberspace law, and the First Amendment.  Several 
scholars have suggested that the massive communicative 
power of the Internet may lead to a paradigm shift in our 
constitutional, statutory, and common law regimes affecting 
speech and information dissemination.120  I would suggest 
that this debate is premature and that the Internet should not 
yet signal a paradigm shift in our legal regimes. 
Every five or ten years—and in the last few years the fre-
quency seems to have increased at an exponential rate—
when there is an advent of new technology, the Supreme 
Court and lower courts grapple with how and whether exist-
ing legal rules can accommodate the challenges posed by the 
new technology, or whether there need to be new legal rules 
or new categories within those legal rules.121 
 
120.  See, e.g., David P. Miranda, Defamation in Cyberspace:  Stratton Oak-
mont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 5 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 229 (1996); Eric Handel-
man, Obscenity and the Internet: Does the Current Onscenity Standard Provide Indi-
viduals with the Proper Consitutional Safeguards, 59 ALB. L. REV. 709 (1995); Stacey J. 
Rappaport, Rules of the Road:  The Constitutional Limits on Restricting Indecent 
Speech on the Information Superhighway, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. 
L.J. 301 (1995). 
121. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 
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For example, as recently as 1984, only thirteen years ago, 
the Supreme Court dealt with the advent of what was then 
the dramatic new technology of the video home recorder.  In 
the context of copyright in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc.,122 the Court considered how and whether 
the judiciary should impose new legal rules to deal with new 
technology.123  Justice Stevens, writing for the majority opin-
ion in Sony in 1984, stated:  
 From its beginning, the law of copyright has devel-
oped in response to significant changes in technology.  
Indeed, it was the invention of the new form of copy-
ing equipment—the printing press—that gave rise to 
the original need for copyright protection.  Repeat-
edly, as new developments have occurred in this 
country, it has been the Congress that has fashioned 
the new rules that new technology made neces-
sary. . . . 
 The judiciary’s reluctance to expand the protections af-
forded by the copyright without explicit legislative guidance 
is a recurring theme.  Sound policy, as well as history, sup-
ports our consistent deference to Congress when major tech-
nological innovations alter the market for copyrighted mate-
rials.  Congress has the constitutional authority and the 
institutional ability to accommodate fully the varied permu-
tations of competing interests that are inevitably implicated 
by such new technology.  In a case like this, in which Con-
gress has not plainly marked our course, we must be cir-
cumspect in construing the scope of rights created by a legis-
lative enactment which never contemplated such a calculus 
of interests.124 
                                                                                                                                  
(1984); Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374 
(1996). 
122. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
123. Id. (considering whether traditional copyright law principles are appli-
cable to videotape recorders). 
124. Id. 430-31 (footnotes and citations omitted). 
   
496 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [7:463 
Justice Stevens was, of course, talking about the copy-
right laws.  But, just last year, in the Denver Area Telecommu-
nications125 case, the Supreme Court considered the effect of 
new technology, specifically cable television, on its tradi-
tional First Amendment jurisprudence.  For what seemed to 
me to be the first time in a very long time, several members 
of the Court seemed willing to adopt a more ad hoc balanc-
ing approach and thus to gut the traditional categories and 
rules that have marked the First Amendment jurisprudence 
up to this day.126 
Whether or not that is justified in the context of the Inter-
net is something we will debate later in this panel, especially 
in the context of the indecency provision.  But, in the area of 
defamation and libel, in particular, a gutting of traditional 
First Amendment rules and common law rules for liability is 
not required.  That is not to say that the Internet will not 
pose new challenges for the courts.  Rather, the challenge 
will be to try and fit traditional legal principles into the con-
text of the Internet environment. 
There are three areas on which I want to focus today.  
These include areas in which the law will require some po-
tential adjustment or rethinking of how the traditional First 
Amendment rules of libel and defamation should apply to 
the Internet.  The first area addresses whether the rules gov-
erning libel or slander should apply to Internet-specific phe-
nomena such as live chat rooms. 
The second area concerns whether the actual malice 
standard, which is a speech, or First Amendment, protective 
standard,127 should have greater application to private plain-
 
125. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374 
(1996). 
126. Compare id. at 2377 (concluding that countervailing interests and other 
forms of regulation provide an alternate basis for the Court’s holding) with supra 
note 1 (explaining traditional First Amendment categorization of speech). 
127. The actual malice standard, as set forth in New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), requires a plaintiff in a defamation action who is 
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tiffs in the Internet environment than in the regular envi-
ronment.  This may be particularly true for two reasons.  
First, private plaintiffs, as opposed to public figure plaintiffs 
who traditionally get this protection,128 arguably have ac-
cess, in the Internet environment, to effective means of 
communication to counteract libelous utterances.  Second, 
private plaintiffs, if they participate in the chat rooms, have 
arguably injected themselves into certain controversies.  
Therefore, private plaintiffs may be more akin to limited-
purpose public figures.129 
                                                                                                                                  
deemed to be a public figure or public official to prove that the defendant made 
the defamatory statement with “actual malice,” defined as “knowledge of the fal-
sity or reckless disregard of the truth.”  Id. at 279-80. The public plaintiff is re-
quired to prove actual malice not merely by a preponderance of the evidence, 
but with “clear and convincing clarity.”  Id. at 285-86.  In Gertz v. Robert Welch, 
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Supreme Court summarized who will be considered 
to be a public figure, and therefore, to whom the Sullivan standards will apply:  
[The public figure] designation may rest on either of two alter-
native bases.  In some instances an individual may achieve 
such pervasive fame or notoriety that he becomes a public fig-
ure for all purposes and in all contexts.  More commonly, an 
individual voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a par-
ticular public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure 
for a limited range of issues.  In either case such persons as-
sume special prominence in the resolution of public questions. 
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. 
128. See id.; see also Contrina L. Counts & C. Amavera Merton, Libel in Cyber-
space:  A Framework Addressing Liability and Jurisdictional Issues in This New Fron-
tier, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1083 (1996); Lee Levine, Judge and Jury in the Lawyer Defmama-
tion:  Putting the Horn Behind the Court, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 3 (1958). 
129. In the context of a defamation action, a limited purpose public figure is 
“an individual who voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular pub-
lic controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of is-
sues.”  Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.  A limited purpose public figure is also subject to 
the Sullivan standard.  See supra note 127 (explaining the Sullivan standard).  See 
also Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1292, cert. denied, 449 
U.S. 898 (1980) (deciding plaintiff was a limited purpose public figure where “he 
was president of second largest cooperative in the country, was known as a lead-
ing advocate of certain precedent-breaking policies, was mover and shaper of 
many of the cooperative’s controversial actions and made it a leader in unit pric-
ing and open dating, and public controversies existed over viability of coopera-
tives as a form of commercial enterprise and over the wisdom of various policies 
that the cooperative of which plaintiff was president was pioneering”); Anderson 
v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (deeming political lobbyists limited purpose 
public figures); Lorain Journal Co. v. Milkovich, 474 U.S. 953 (1985) (deeming 
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The third area in which the Internet will challenge tradi-
tional rules is the liability of new actors who are created by 
the Internet environment, particularly the online service 
provider.130  Two recent cases, which I will discuss in detail 
when I address this topic, have addressed the liability of 
CompuServe131 and Prodigy,132 two online service providers.  
These decisions may have repercussions on commercial and 
noncommercial entities that actually disseminate the mes-
sage, so to speak. 
Let me quickly run through, in more detail, these three 
areas and suggest an approach in which to look at each of 
them. 
The first issue is whether the categories of libel or slander 
should apply to transitory online discussions.  As the three-
judge court in the ACLU case detailed in its extensive find-
ings of fact, one of the unique features of the Internet is live, 
or transitory, chat groups.133  In these online groups, a mes-
sage is transmitted to a wide number of people, but is not 
really stored in a computer’s memory.  A message therefore 
oftentimes has a very transitory existence.134  A chat group is 
most akin to a live radio or television call-in show. 
The issue, as I mentioned, is whether the rules of slander 
or libel are more applicable in the Internet environment.  
Under traditional common law principles, slander, in order 
to be actionable, requires proof of special damages or actual 
pecuniary loss by the plaintiff.135  Four categories of excep-
                                                                                                                                  
wrestling coach limited purpose public figure). 
130. See Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); 
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1995); see also Joseph M. Campollo, Childporn.GIF:  Establishing Liability for Online 
Service Providers, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 721 (1996). 
131. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
132. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 
323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995). 
133. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 835. 
134. Id. 
135. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 112, 
at 788 (5th ed. 1984). 
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tions are considered slander per se, however, in which you 
do not need to prove actual pecuniary loss, because the con-
tent of the statement is considered so horrendous.136  Exam-
ples of libel per se include the chastity of a woman, sexual 
misconduct, or attributing loathsome diseases to the plain-
tiff.137 
In libel, there is also a distinction between libel in which 
you need not prove special damages, termed libel per se, 
and libel in which you must prove special damages.138  In 
the libel context, though, it does not matter what the content 
of the communication is.  Instead, if something is viewed as 
defamatory on its face, whatever the content of that utter-
ance, then you  need not prove special damages.139 
This traditional common law distinction between slander 
and libel on the need to prove damages is based on the the-
ory that written words are generally more permanent and 
therefore have greater consequence, regardless of whether 
there is actual loss to the plaintiff.140  In addition to greater 
permanency, written words also are capable of wider circu-
lation (which also inherently leads to greater harm), and are 
viewed as the product of greater deliberation by the author.  
For all of these reasons, there is less need to prove special 
damages in the case of libel. 
In the context of online chat rooms, the question arises as 
to whether an individual’s message should be viewed as an 
oral statement, in which the rules of slander should apply, or 
as written words, in which the rules of libel should apply.  
On the one hand, particularly when the online chat rooms 
are not stored in the computer’s memory, the words are 
transitory, and therefore more akin to slander.  Unlike writ-
 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. KEETON ET AL., supra note 135, § 112, at 786. 
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ten words that have a permanent value, the message imme-
diate dissipates.  Also, the words that people speak or write 
in the context of an online chat room are arguably more 
spontaneous.  They do not have the same quality of delibera-
tion that generally goes into the written word.  Therefore, 
you could argue that the more relaxed rules of slander 
should apply. 
On the other hand, one of the biggest arguments in favor 
of applying the rule of libel to the Internet is that words that 
are disseminated through the Internet, like written words, 
are capable of broad circulation.141  So, unlike the spoken 
word in which only a handful of people can hear you, in the 
Internet environment, you have widespread dissemination, 
which can lead to great potential harm.  So, there is also an 
argument that the rules of libel are more applicable to 
speech on the Internet. 
Not surprisingly, given how new this area of the law is, 
there is no published case addressing the issue of whether 
libel or slander is more applicable to Internet speech.  Un-
doubtedly, courts will consider the different legal argu-
ments.  In my opinion, the existing framework and categori-
cal distinctions between slander and libel can probably be 
accommodated in the context of a particular factual situation 
to address the issue. 
The second area in which the Internet will challenge, or 
potentially expand, First Amendment protection for a tradi-
tional libel or defamation claim is in the context of private 
plaintiffs.  For a public figure to prevail in a libel case against 
a media defendant, he or she must prove that the defendant 
acted with actual malice under the traditional standard set 
forth in the landmark case of New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van.142  Actual malice in this context means either knowledge 
 
141. See John Hielsher, Banks Gear up to Give AC Banking Another Turn, 
SARASOTA HERALD TRIB., Mar. 31, 1997, at 12. 
142. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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that a statement is false or subjective awareness of its prob-
able falsity.143  It is a pretty speech-protective standard, as it 
is not enough for a defendant to have published a statement 
that turns out to be false and defamatory through negligence 
or without full investigation.144  If a newspaper runs some-
thing that turns out to be false, as long as it was not made 
with actual knowledge of falsity or awareness of probable 
falsity, the defendant would prevail when the plaintiff is a 
public figure.145 
In the private figure context, however, the rules are a lit-
tle more relaxed.  Although there is still no strict liability for 
defamation under the First Amendment, it is a lesser stan-
dard of care—usually negligence in most states.146  A defen-
dant may therefore be held liable to a private figure for neg-
ligently publishing a false and defamatory statement about 
the private figure.147 
The issue of whether there should be a greater or lesser 
standard of care in the Internet arises for two reasons.  First, 
it is arguable that the private plaintiff, by entering a chat 
room or otherwise posting words on the Internet, entered 
into a realm of debate.  It is analogous to the limited-purpose 
public figure who enters the vortex of a public debate.  There 
is an argument that, like public figures, such private figures 
have exposed themselves to a certain amount of attention. 
The second, and in my opinion more important, reason is 
that the private plaintiff in the Internet environment, like a 
public figure in the traditional environment, arguably has 
access to effective channels of communication to counteract 
any false speech.  The traditional rationale for having a more 
relaxed standard of care for media defendants when a public 
 
143. See id. at 279-80. 
144. See id. 
145. See id. 
146. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
147. KEETON ET AL., supra note 135, § 112, at 788. 
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figure is involved is that a public figure has access to the 
press; if a false statement is uttered about her, she can go to 
the press and counteract false speech with more speech.  A 
private figure, on the other hand, does not usually have the 
same access to effective channels of communication. 
In the Internet environment, however, a private plaintiff 
arguably has greater access than usual to communication.  A 
private plaintiff Internet user arguably can go back to the 
same chat room or bulletin board and counteract bad speech 
with more speech.  So again, because of the greater dissem-
ination of information that is capable on the Internet, higher 
First Amendment standards should apply.  Therefore, there 
is less of a need to regulate potentially libelous statements. 
The final area in which I think the First Amendment will 
be affected by Internet technology in the libel context is the 
liability of the online service provider.  Two recent cases 
reached opposite conclusions on this issue.148 
Traditionally, liability for defamation attaches to not only  
the author of a defamatory statement, but also the publisher, 
the person who disseminates the information.149  A print 
publisher, including a book publisher such as Random 
House or Time Inc., is presumed to have the author’s 
knowledge of a publication’s content.150  Thus, the same 
knowledge is essentially attributed to the initial publisher as 
to the author.151  The law imposes this presumptive knowl-
edge, in part, to require that the entity publishing—the pri-
mary publisher—fully inspect the content of its publica-
tions.152 
In contrast to the initial publisher, the distributor of print 
material, such as a newsstand or bookstore, is liable for 
 
148. See Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); 
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Serv. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (1995). 
149. KEETON ET AL., supra note 135, § 113, at 799-800. 
150. See id. § 113, at 801. 
151. See id. 
152. See id. 
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defamation only if it actually knows or has reason to know 
of the defamatory content of the material.153  A presumption 
of knowledge governs it154—a lower standard that derives 
from the First Amendment.  In the 1959 Supreme Court case 
of Smith v. California,155 the Court held that a statute that im-
posed criminal liability on a book seller for selling an ob-
scene book, even if the bookseller had no knowledge of the 
book’s content, is prohibited under the First Amendment.156  
The Court was concerned about the self-censorship that 
would result if a book distributor or newsstand were forced 
to inspect the contents of every single item on its shelves.157 
Essentially, the issue in the Internet environment is 
whether the online service provider should be viewed more 
like an initial publisher, who has a duty to inspect the con-
tent of the statements that it publishes, or more like a book 
distributor, who does not.  Two recent cases came to differ-
ing conclusions on this issue. 
The first case, Cubby v. Compuserve,158 was before the 
Southern District of New York in 1991.  In Cubby, the court 
held that CompuServe acted more like a book distributor, 
and consequently was not liable as a primary publisher and 
had no First Amendment duty to inspect the content of 
whatever was distributed.159 
The second case was Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy,160 
which was in the New York Supreme Court in 1995.  That 
case held that Prodigy, for a number of fact-specific, and I 
would suggest erroneous, reasons, concluded that Prodigy 
was more like the initial publisher and should have screened 
 
153. See id. 
154. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 135, § 113, at 799-800. 
155. 361 U.S. 147 (1959). 
156. See id. at 155. 
157. See id. at 153. 
158. 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
159. Id. 
160. 1995 WL 323710. 
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the content of the material.  Prodigy in fact claimed to have 
screened the content of various materials, and so therefore 
could be liable, just as the original author and the original 
publisher.161 
The Stratton Oakmont decision was essentially overruled 
legislatively by the CDA, not by the indecency provisions, 
but rather by the “Good Samaritan provision.”162  That pro-
vision, section 230(c), states that “no provider or user of an 
interactive computer service shall be treated as a publisher 
or speaker of information provided by another content pro-
vider.”163  This basically means that the Prodigys and 
CompuServes of the world that publish information man-
aged by an independent contractor (for example, the person 
who runs the bulletin board) cannot be held liable as the ini-
tial publisher. 
The issue that now arises under this provision is whether 
this provision creates an absolute immunity from liability, 
which most people seem to think was not intended.  So, al-
though the CDA now says that the Prodigys and Compu-
Serves of the world should not be treated as print publishers, 
the issue now is whether they can be held liable as book dis-
tributors.  Under a literal reading of the new statutory provi-
sion, if CompuServe actually has notice or knowledge of de-
famatory material and continues to distribute the material, it 
cannot be held liable.  That clearly was not what was in-
tended by section 230(c), but it will be interesting to see how 
courts interpret it. 
Overall, I think one of the most interesting areas that will 
emerge from this, besides the liability of the online service 
provider, is the liability of other new entities operating in the 
Internet environment, especially managers of the bulletin 
boards and independent contractors with whom the online 
 
161. See id. at *4. 
162. See id.; 47 U.S.C.A. § 230 (West Supp. 1996). 
163. 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(c)(1). 
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service providers contract.  It seems acceptable to have the 
online service provider viewed as a book distributor, but 
only if the law imposes the duty to inspect content upon an 
entity other than the author.  Absent some finding that 
someone with a deeper pocket than the author is liable, we 
will have a rough world ahead in which a lot of defamatory 
utterances will probably be made with impunity. 
MR. JOLLYMORE:  We now go to the core topic of this 
panel, the CDA and its provisions.  I trust that Chris Hansen 
will tell us why they are all unconstitutional.   
MR. HANSEN:  In order to talk about the ACLU v. Reno  
case, the ACLU’s attack on the CDA, you must first discuss 
the concept of indecency.  As the first speaker, Mr. Pawlik, 
suggested, we did not challenge the law against obscenity in 
the context of cyberspace; we challenged indecency.  In my 
mind, there is a very simple way to understand the differ-
ence:  obscenity is speech about sex that has no redeeming 
social value,164 whereas indecency is speech about sex that 
does in fact have redeeming social value.165  It is indecency, 
not obscenity, that the CDA attempts to make a crime.166 
Under the CDA, if you engage in speech about sex on the 
Internet, even if that speech is valuable speech (at least for 
adults), you can go to jail for up to two years.167  That law 
applies not only to the media conglomerates to which we 
have previously applied indecency law, including the televi-
sion and cable networks, but also to every single American 
who sends an e-mail message to her friends168 or who com-
municates through a news group169 or in a chat room.170  It 
 
164. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). 
165. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 746. 
166. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a), (b), (d) (West Supp. 1996). 
167. See id. § 223(a), (d). 
168. The term e-mail refers to electronic mail, which comprises messages 
sent from computer to computer via the Internet.  See G. BURGESS ALLISON, THE 
LAWYER’S GUIDE TO THE INTERNET 332 (1995); see also ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 834. 
169. The term news group refers to a bulletin board style discussion group 
that is operated over the Internet.  See ALLISON, supra note 168, at 336; see also 
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applies not just to the Web; it applies to all of the communi-
cative aspects of the Internet, as well as to all of the display 
aspects of the Internet.171 
There are two huge difficulties with the CDA that have 
led six federal judges unanimously to hold it unconstitu-
tional.172  The first problem is that speakers cannot comply 
with the law.  The CDA makes it a crime if you speak in such 
a way that it can be heard by someone under the age of 
eighteen.173  For any of you who have been on the Internet, 
you know that it is not possible to determine whether the 
people reading your speech are over or under the age of 
eighteen.  Well, if you are a Web site operator, or if you are 
posting a message on a news group or engaging in speech in 
a chat room, there is literally no way for you to know 
whether the person who is reading your message is over or 
under eighteen. 
As a result, you cannot speak in so-called indecent 
words, you cannot speak about so-called indecent concepts, 
and you cannot engage in adult, socially valuable, constitu-
tionally-protected speech on the Internet.  All of us would 
have to take our speech on the Internet down to the level 
deemed suitable for the most vulnerable minors in the most 
conservative county in this country.  The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly held that we cannot suppress adult speech in the 
guise of protecting children,174 and that is precisely what the 
                                                                                                                                  
ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 834-35.  Bulletin board services provide Internet access 
and allow individuals to communicate and exchange information.  ACLU, 929 F. 
Supp. at 833. 
170. Chat rooms are services offered by commercial Internet-access provid-
ers where users can interact with each other by text in real time.  ACLU, 929 F. 
Supp. at 835. 
171. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d). 
172. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 883 (finding that the CDA violates the First 
Amendment and enjoining its enforcement); Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 950 (agreeing 
with the ACLU court that section 233(d) of the CDA is unconstitutional). 
173. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a), (b), (d). 
174. See, e.g., Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957) (reversing defendant’s 
conviction for violating Michigan obscene literature statute, holding that Michi-
gan statute, which made it an offense to make available to general reading public 
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CDA attempts to do. 
Now, let me give you some idea of the CDA’s conse-
quences by talking about some of the clients I represent in 
that case.  As you heard, the ACLU filed a suit on the date 
the law was signed.175  Approximately three weeks later, the 
ACLU was joined by the American Library Association, 
along with the entire Internet industry—CompuServe, Prod-
igy, Microsoft, AOL, and so on.176  But I think it is most use-
ful to talk about the kinds of people that I represent in the 
ACLU case. 
I represent the ACLU itself.  The ACLU has a Web site on 
which it posts a copy of the “seven dirty words” case dis-
cussed earlier.177  It is available to anyone who wants to see 
it.  The Supreme Court has already found that the mono-
logue in that case, which is attached to the decision, is inde-
cent.178  The ACLU, therefore, by putting up a Supreme 
Court decision, risks going to jail under the CDA. 
                                                                                                                                  
a book having a potentially deleterious influence on youth, violates due process 
clause by restricting freedom of speech and effectively reducing adult population 
to reading only what is fit for children); Sable Communications of California, Inc. 
v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (explaining its prohibition of government from ban-
ning the dissemination of indecent material to adults, while simultaneously ac-
knowledging the government’s compelling interest in protecting children from 
pornographic material, by stating, “the government may not reduce the adult 
population . . . to . . . only what is fit for children”); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 
U.S. 629 (1968) (establishing that “because children generally do not possess the 
same capacity as adults to make informed choices about whether to view inde-
cent material, and because the speech may have deep and harmful effects on 
children that cannot readily  be undone, there is no First Amendment right to 
distribute indecent material to children.”); id. (“The government regulation that 
prohibits the dissemination of indecent material to children, while not prohibit-
ing dissemination to adults, is fully consistent with the First Amendment.”).  See 
Brief for Appellant at 20, ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (No. 96-
511). 
175. The ACLU filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the CDA, and 
President Clinton signed the CDA into law, on February 8, 1996. 
176. For a comprehensive list of organizations who joined the ACLU as 
plaintiffs in their challenge to the CDA, see ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 827-28. 
177. ACLU, ACLU, American Civil Liberties Union, Freedom Network (visited 
Apr. 16, 1997) <http://www.aclu.org>. 
178. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 741. 
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Similarly, I represent Human Rights Watch.179  Human 
Rights Watch puts up its reports on human rights abuses all 
over the world.180  Some of those reports contain descrip-
tions of sexual torture and sexual abuse that are quite horri-
fying, quite graphic, and quite extreme.181  That speech is po-
tentially criminal under the CDA. 
I also represent Planned Parenthood and a series of other 
groups that put up on their Web sites speech involving safer 
sex practices.182  For example, I represent the Critical Path 
AIDS Web page that is run by a single guy in Philadel-
phia.183  He puts up a huge amount of information on his 
Web site about safer sex practices.  He does it for a couple of 
reasons.  He does it because he wants to prevent the trans-
mission of AIDS and he wants to prevent people from get-
ting death-causing diseases.184  In posting the information on 
his Web site, he sometimes uses the street names for various 
sexual practices and sexual organs, because in his view it is 
extremely important for adults—and, for that matter, for 
teen-agers as well—to know what works and what does not 
work.  If you post it using the Latinate terms for the various 
sexual practices and organs, not everyone will understand 
what you are trying to convey.  He puts that kind of infor-
mation on his Web site, which could result in his arrest and 
imprisonment under the CDA. 
 
179. The Human Rights Watch conducts regular investigations of human 
rights abuses in approximately seventy countries around the world. Human 
Rights Watch, About Human Rights Watch (visited Apr. 20, 1997) 
<http://www.hrw.org/about/ about.html>.  The organization “addresses the 
human rights practices of governments of all political stripes, geo-political 
alignments, and of all ethnic and religious persuasions.”  Id. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
182. Planned parenthood web cite. 
183. Critical Path AIDS Project, The Critical Path World Wide Web site (visited 
Apr. 16, 1997) <http://www.critpath.org>. 
184. See Critical Path AIDS Project, AIDS Prevention (visited Apr. 16, 1997) 
<http://www.critpath.org/prevent.htm>. 
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I represent Wildcat Press,185 which is a publisher of gay 
and lesbian literature, largely fiction.  Wildcat Press has a 
discussion area called “Youth Art News,” a forum in which 
gay and lesbian teenagers can post poetry, artwork, and fic-
tion, as well as nonfiction, about what it is to discover as a 
teenager that you are gay or lesbian, and what it is to deal 
with the kinds of feelings that affect you as you go through 
that process.  They put that up not only because it is benefi-
cial to the speakers—the kids who are putting up the infor-
mation—but also because it is enormously useful, for exam-
ple, for the one gay kid in Boise, Idaho, who has never met 
anyone else whom he knows is gay and who needs to make 
contact with other people to deal with his feelings.  Under 
the CDA, the kids posting this material could potentially go 
to jail. 
Now, based on what we have been doing in court, Ted 
may respond that I am exaggerating the dangers here—that 
is, the risk of people who might go to jail.  However, re-
member that indecency is speech that is about sex but that 
has social value. If indecency does not include material like 
this, then I do not know what it includes.  At a time when 
states and school boards are passing laws trying to take 
rights away from gay people and the Clinton Administration 
is trying to prevent gay people in the military from even say-
ing out loud, “I’m gay,” to suggest that no one is going to 
find speech about being gay patently offensive seems to me 
hopelessly naive.  I certainly do not feel comfort, and nor 
should anyone, at the thought that I might have to go to 
prison for engaging in that kind of speech. 
The other negative result of the CDA is its effect on the 
Internet.  As you know, the Internet contains a variety of dif-
ferent aspects, many of which are simple communication 
back and forth, including, for example, a news group, a chat 
 
185. Wildcat Press, Gay Wired-Wildcat Press, The Wildcat Press World Wide 
Web site (visited Apr. 17, 1997) <http://www.gaywired.com/~unity/wildcat>. 
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room, a mail exploder,186 and a list server.187  All of these are 
methods by which we engage in conversation on the Inter-
net.  Because it is literally impossible to engage in age verifi-
cation in any of these kinds of aspects, either people must 
use purely child-friendly speech, or we are simply going to 
drive all speech of that kind out of the Internet.  We are go-
ing to reduce the Internet from what it has been:  an incredi-
bly empowering medium; a medium that gives me the same 
power to speak as Ted Turner or as Time Inc., a power that 
none of us has ever had in human history—the power for 
each individual to speak to every other individual around 
the globe.  If the CDA is allowed to go into effect, either we 
are all going to be driven out of the Internet or we are going 
to have to censor our speech on this medium.  Each and 
every one of us will have to be careful every time we open 
our mouths—that is, every time we go to our computers. 
If put into effect, the CDA could well force the Internet to 
become much more like traditional broadcast media.  In-
stead of many people speaking to many people, the CDA 
could force the Internet to be a medium where only big cor-
porations can afford to screen their speech or to find out 
whether people coming to their site are minors.  The CDA 
would have a potentially disastrous effect on the really 
wonderful qualities that have led the Internet to flourish. 
The CDA is not the only statute addressing the Internet.  
I would like to talk about two others very briefly.  One, the 
New York statute, has been referred to.188  New York tries to 
do similar things as the CDA, with slightly different wrin-
kles, but it has all the same vices of the CDA. 
 
186. The term “mail exploder” refers to automatic mailing list services that 
allow communication via e-mail about particular topics of interest to subscribers. 
See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 927. 
187. The term “listserve” refers to a particular brand of mail exploder.  See 
supra note 186; Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 927.  Listservs are mailing list services that 
“allow communication about particular subjects of interest to a group of people.”  
ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 834. 
188. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.00 (McKinney 1996). 
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There are other laws in Georgia, which the ACLU has 
also challenged:189  one that prohibits anonymous speech on 
the Internet190 and another that prohibits the use of trade-
marks on the Internet in such a way that it might imply that 
you have permission to use the trademark.191  Any of you 
who have an e-mail address understand how much prohibit-
ing anonymous speech on the Internet would change the 
habits of the Internet. 
More troubling, however, is that the New York and the 
Georgia laws are both state efforts to regulate the Internet.  
State law regulation of the Internet presents huge problems 
under the Commerce Clause,192 an issue that has not yet 
been fully litigated, but is being litigated in those two cases.  
How do we allow each of the fifty states to regulate what is 
essentially a global medium?  If you have a Web site on the 
Internet, you can be found guilty in Georgia for one thing 
and in Alabama for the opposite thing.  How can you possi-
bly change your Web site in such a way that you are ac-
commodating conflicting laws of different states?  The short 
answer is that you cannot.  State regulation of the Internet 
presents very serious Commerce Clause problems, which I 
suspect may be one of the next big areas of law that we must 
address concerning the Internet. 
The Supreme Court is scheduled to hear argument on the 
CDA case on March 19 and should come to a decision by the 
end of this Term, roughly the end of June.193  Thus, if we get 
together again, we can talk about the enormous way in 
 
189. See ACLU v. Miller, No. 96-2475 (N.D. Ga. filed Sept. 23, 1996). 
190. See GA. CODE ANN. § 46-5-3 (1996).  For an excellent discussion of ano-
nymity in cyberspace, see Jonathan I. Edelstein, Anonymity and International Law 
Enforcement in Cyberspace, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 231 (1996). 
191. See id. § 16-9-93.1. 
192. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3. 
193. The Supreme Court heard oral argument on March 19, 1997.  ACLU v. 
Reno:  A Chronology (visited June 9, 1997) 
<http://www.aclu.org/news/n050896.htm/>.  For a transcript of the oral ar-
gument, see 1997 WL 136253. 
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which the Supreme Court protected free speech on the 
Internet. 
MR. JOLLYMORE:  Thank you very much, Chris.  Ted 
Hirt, do you have a few things to add to that? 
MR. HIRT:  Like Chris, I too will try to be brief and just 
hit the high points of the government’s defense of the CDA. 
I want to thank the IPLJ and Fordham Law School for 
their invitation.  My principal caveat is that I do not purport 
to be an official spokesperson for the Department, so the 
views I express here today are my own, though, hopefully, 
they will coincide with the government’s position in this 
case. 
I want to talk briefly about the CDA and the govern-
ment’s defense of it.  I will also make a few observations on 
the CDA’s implications for regulation of the Internet gener-
ally. 
I cannot resist starting with the vagueness challenge194 
that has been made against the CDA because the interesting 
thing is that, while I do not like to do head counting, there 
was a case that we should mention because it is in the “four 
corners” of this judicial district, called Shea v. Reno.195  In 
Shea, a three-judge court, following the Philadelphia Court’s 
decision in ACLU, struck down the CDA.196  What is inter-
esting about that decision is that all three judges, in contrast 
to two of the three Philadelphia judges, did not have trouble 
with the textual term “indecency” in terms of the vagueness 
issues raised by Mr. Hansen and his colleagues.197 
The Shea court pointed out that the Conference Report 
that led to the enactment of the CDA was very clear.  The 
 
194. The vagueness issue refers to the alleged vagueness in the meaning of 
“indecency” as used in the CDA.  See 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a), (d). 
195. 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3323 
(1996) (No. 96-595). 
196. See id. at 950. 
197. See id. at 935-38. 
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report showed that Congress was using the definition of in-
decency that came out of a body of precedent, judicial and 
administrative, including the FCC. 198  So, for Mr. Hansen to 
say that “socially redeeming” Web sites will be attacked as a 
result of the CDA is not really the accurate story if you com-
pare the Web sites of his plaintiffs with the Conference Re-
port and FCC rulings that they cite. 
In re King Broadcasting Co.199 is one of the FCC rulings 
cited by the Shea court.  In that case, the FCC decided to take 
no action in response to a complaint about a broadcast 
show—I believe it was on television—that involved frank 
discussions of teenage sexuality and had explicit lan-
guage.200  I do not know if the material was as explicit as that 
on the Critical Path AIDS Web page noted by Mr. Hansen, 
but I also do not know that it would be meaningfully differ-
ent.  The Shea court essentially said, “Look, this is what Con-
gress said, and this is what the government has represented, 
and we think that people can consult these bodies of prece-
dents.”201 
Some of the interesting things about the Internet include, 
of course, what everyone talks about:  its decentralization, 
that is, its lack of central control, and its twenty-four-hour-a-
day availability.  What people do not say, however, is that it 
will be ubiquitous or pervasive, because if they said that, 
then the logical corollary of this expansive syllogism brings 
us four-square into the very language of Pacifica, which em-
phasized the pervasiveness of broadcast media in upholding 
the challenged restriction of “indecent” speech.202 
 
198. See 142 CONG. REC. H1129 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1996) (introducing Confer-
ence Committee Report on the Communications Decency Act) (“The conferees 
intend that the term indecency (and the rendition of the definition of that term in 
new section 502) has the same meaning as established in . . . Sable Communications 
of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).”). 
199. 5 F.C.C.R. 2971 (1990). 
200. Id. 
201. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 938. 
202. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49. 
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It is ironic in the cable context that cable, as you may 
know, really grew up largely from nowhere in response to 
geographic concerns about the carriage of TV signals.  Then 
we had the 1984 Cable Act,203 and by 1992, when the “must-
carry” part of the 1992 statute204 was challenged,205 cable was 
starting to penetrate sixty to sixty-five percent of house-
holds.  As the first speaker, Mr. Pawlik, indicated, the Play-
boy court,206 which dealt with cable scrambling of adult en-
tertainment, pointed out that cable TV is, in a sense, as 
pervasive as former traditional broadcast.207  The Denver 
Area case comes close to saying that as well.208 
I am not arguing that there is a computer in every house-
hold, but we know the trends of both demographics and 
education, and I think it is clear—I do not hear anyone dis-
puting—that at least Congress, in representing the public in-
terest, has a legitimate, if not compelling, interest in trying to 
regulate the access of children to indecency—or what I will 
call pornography. 
So, if we start with the notion that there is a problem with 
indecent speech on the Web, then we hear that the problem 
is so vast, so uncontrollable, and so uncontainable, that the 
government can do nothing about it.  But I do not think that 
is the way to look at how to deal with the problem—one that 
is visible, apparent, and has not gone away.  Everything that 
we have seen shows that while private industry tries to use 
blocking mechanisms and tries to sell software, we always 
have the problem—which is true in any medium—that you 
 
203. Cable Communications Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 
(codified at 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 521-559 (West Supp. 1996)). 
204. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 
Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
205. See Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994). 
206. Playboy Entert. Group, Inc. v. United States, 945 F. Supp. 772 (D. Del. 
1996). 
207. Id. at 786-87. 
208. See Denver Area Educ. Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 
116 S. Ct. 2374, 2386 (1996). 
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have parents who are unwilling, unable, or ignorant of how 
to put a lock on a cable box, how to take the remote control 
away, or how to program a computer.  So, we are always go-
ing to have the “catch-up” problems of the private sector try-
ing to regulate. 
At the same time, people say that indecent speech cannot 
be regulated by the government, but then tell us that, some-
how, the private sector will regulate it for us.  So, I think 
there are some internal contradictions to some of the argu-
ments made by the opponents of the CDA. 
If we start with the premises that there is a problem and  
that the government can do something about it, then we turn 
to the practical problem:  can the government do something 
about it in some meaningful, effective way? 
I think it is interesting, in terms of the applications on the 
Internet, that Senator Exon and the other sponsors were real-
ly looking at what they identified as a very discrete problem.  
They were saying that computer bulletin boards and Web 
sites were being used by commercial pornographers, with 
their profits in mind, to purvey pornography, and that it was 
accessible to children.209  Putting up a warning on the first 
page of your home page saying, “Warning:  You must be 
twenty-one to enter” is sort of an attractive nuisance. 
What is interesting about the CDA is that what you see 
today in the real world is that the commercial pornographers 
do in fact have adult identification systems.  One of the af-
firmative defenses, obviously, under the CDA’s section 
223(e)(5)(b),210 is the availability of adult identification or 
some sort of credit card or other type of check.  So, ironi-
cally, the CDA can be extremely effective as a defense for the 
very pornographers to whom it was directed. 
 
209. 141 CONG. REC. S8089-8090 (daily ed. June 9, 1995); 141 CONG. REC. 
S8333 (daily ed. June 14, 1995). 
210. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(e)(5)(b). 
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To some extent, I think that the plaintiffs and we are “two 
ships crossing in the night.”  I do not know if that has been 
said in public before, but we have often said it to ourselves, 
because there are people, such as those represented by Mr. 
Hansen, who are very concerned about this particular issue.  
While I am not discounting their concern, when you look at 
what Congress was trying to do, you see that Congress was 
looking at an entirely different aspect of the Internet. 
Mr. Hansen says that these two are going to get hope-
lessly enmeshed.  I think that the vagueness issue, which I 
have addressed, tries to separate that out.  If you have a clear 
body of precedent, you are not going to have a situation 
where the pornographers are going to be ignored and Mr. 
Hansen’s clients somehow are going to come under investi-
gatory agency oversight in terms of prosecutions under the 
CDA. 
But the second issue, which Mr. Hansen has pointed out, 
is how do you regulate this?  I think we have pointed out 
that the commercial pornographers have a way of doing it, 
and they can do it.  And, as the Solicitor General’s brief in 
the Supreme Court points out,211 if commercial users of the 
Internet can find ways to channel speech so that adults, but 
not children, can speak, then there is no reason why non-
profit organizations cannot do that.  There is no reason why 
they cannot have adult verification systems. 
It is true that you cannot really verify anything over the 
Internet, per se, though recent electronic commerce is doing  
that with credit cards.  But with computer bulletin board 
systems, as the United States v. Thomas212 case indicated, 
there are a lot of situations in which you call back, you send 
a driver’s license, or you send some age identifier or other 
verifier, allowing the sender to restrict transmissions by 
 
211. Brief for Appellant at 10, ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 
1996) (No. 96-511). 
212. 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 74 (1996). 
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age.213 
So, I think that when we say things like, “we cannot regu-
late it,” “it is too big a problem,” and “you will have foreign 
sites,” public policymakers should look at these arguments.  
But when Congress looks at the problem as it does and says, 
“This is a medium.  We are looking at it.  We recognize the 
First Amendment implications.  Here is how we think we 
can resolve these competing concerns,” I think that Congress 
in fact should be given deference in that respect. 
Thank you. 
MR. JOLLYMORE:  Thank you very much, Ted.  The last 
word, except for questions and answers, belongs to Parry 
Aftab. 
MS. AFTAB:  I will keep this short.  Let me give you a 
slightly different perspective.  How many of you have Inter-
net accounts through an online service like AOL?  Just about 
all of you.  You understand that you cannot get to Web sites 
unless you have an address for the Uniform Resource Loca-
tor (“URL”),214 or you do a search using one of the search 
engines215 or other mechanisms for finding one site that will 
lead you there.  If any of you have been searching for par-
 
213. In Thomas, the Sixth Circuit affirmed a federal obscenity conviction, 
holding that the intangible form of a computer bulletin board did not preclude 
prosecution for interstate transportation of lewd materials.  74 F.3d at 705.  
There, a federal postal inspector investigating a complaint about the Thomas 
computer site mailed an application form and $55 fee to the site.  Id.  Defendant 
then gave the agent a password which would allow him to access the site.  Id. 
214. URL is the addressing format used to identify specific Internet loca-
tions.  ALLISON, supra note 168, at 339. 
215. According to one commentator:  
Search engines typically disperse Web crawlers to scour the network 
and compile an index of existing documents.  These agents note 
changes within existing documents and update the index, which is 
stored in the search-engine hardware’s RAM. . . . The deeper the 
crawler goes and the more elegantly the index cross-references, the 
more relevant results will be. 
Jim Balderston, Search Engine Vendors eye Intra nets:  Tech Update Intranets Mean 
that search tools must be fine-tuned for Corporate needs, INFOWORLD, July 1, 1996, at 
41. 
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ticular sites and have had problems finding them, you know 
that it is not always easy to find Web sites. 
When marketing a Web site on the Net, commercial sites 
are looking for hits—that is, the number of people who visit 
them— so that they can get outside advertisements.216  Our 
Web site has about 10,000 regular visitors every month, and 
those numbers are important to us. 
There are a lot of Web masters, people who design Web 
sites.217  They want to increase the traffic so that they can 
say, “I had 20,000 hits last month,” or “I had 50,000 hits last 
month,” and “therefore, I am entitled to this much in adver-
tisement revenue.”  To accomplish this, they hide text in 
what is called metatext.218  When you pull up a Web site, 
there are things that you do not see.  Sometimes, if you have 
ever seen something printed out, you see all these little car-
ets around certain language.  That is coding, the way Word-
Perfect would code certain things to tell the computer to in-
dent text, to put in certain punctuation, or to do certain 
things with sizing.  Metatext is invisible to the viewer, but it 
is very visible to the Web spiders and the search engines that 
go around, scour the Net, and pick up the first twenty-five 
or fifty words off of every Web site because they look for key 
words.219 
 
216. Kodak, for example, judged the success of its Web site, in part, by the 
40,000 software files that were downloaded from its site in the first quarter of 
1996.  William Patalon III, Grass Roots Effort to Create Kodak’s Internet Home Page 
Proves Successful, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, July 24, 1996, at S12. 
217. “Web master” is a term that may encompass a number of different re-
sponsibilities, including building and running a company’s web site, “respond-
ing to e-mail from customers, fixing technical glitches in a Web site, or writing 
and editing copy for the site.”  S.F. CHRON., Feb. 13, 1997, at B1.  Although Web 
masters are not nationally certified, there is a movement for national standards 
currently underway.  Id.  However, there is no agreement, even among members 
of the Webmaster’s Guild, as to what a Web master actually is.  Id. 
218. Metatext is the internal code in a computer program that contains for-
matting instructions.  Guide to the World of Multimedia, Part IA:  Roundup of CD 
Formats, NEW MEDIA AGE, June 22, 1995, at 11. 
219. In terms of marketing:  
[w]hen the information search itself becomes the primary focus [of data 
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People who are trying to market their site will put the 
word “sex” into the metatext.220  The more times you use it, 
the higher your number of hits, so that when people are 
looking for a lot of traffic and they go into Alta Vista,221 or 
any of the other Web site search engines and they type in 
“sex,” their site is going to come up.  Our site comes up 
when you type “sex” because we talk about sexual harass-
ment and sex discrimination in our legal site.  I do not know 
if that is part of the reason we get 10,000 hits a month, but I 
would like to think it is not. 
You have to understand how the Net really works.  
Those of us who have been on the Net for a long time (and 
therefore have no life and are proud of the fact that we are 
geeks) have a lot of problems with censorship because a lot 
of the people who are trying to censor, regulate, or moderate 
activity on the Internet are people who do not understand 
how it works. 
We talk about PICS and various filtering software.  There 
are a lot of different ways of filtering what kids, or anyone 
else, is seeing on the Internet.  Some of the filtering mecha-
nisms use search words.222  Others scour the Net and find of-
fensive sites, or inoffensive sites, which is really what they 
are doing now, because it is a lot easier to find the ones that 
                                                                                                                                  
upon which business decisions can be based], messages . . . are replaced 
by codes or metatexts.  Under the impact of marketing discourse, one 
salient code or metatext is the ‘consumer orientation’ . . . [utilized so 
that] the market can be used as a justification for internal decisions. 
Lars T. Christenson, Buffering Organization Identity in the Marketing Culture, EUR. 
GROUP ORGANIZATIONAL STUD., Sept. 22, 1995, at 651. 
220. See Dan Gillmor, Policing a Few Bad Apples Could Cut Into Internet Free-
doms for All, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 3, 1997, at 15; Marc Perton, Netting the 
Right Fish, ASIA, INC., June 1996, at 56. 
221. Alta Vista Technology Inc., The Alta Vista Technology Inc. (visited Apr. 
16, 1996) <http://www.alta.vista.com>. 
222. Search words are terms or key words that are used by a search engine 
to locate sites on a particular topic.  Useful Strategies for Teachers Going Online, 
DOMINION, May 27, 1996, at 22 [hereinafter Useful Strategies]; ACLU, 929 F. Supp 
at 836-37.  In effect, “[t]he search engine ‘crawls’ the Web finding sites containing 
the words.”  Useful Strategies, supra, at 22. 
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are clean under someone’s standards, then to find the ones 
that are not.223 
My problem is that when people are trying to regulate 
these, they really do not know what they are doing.  PICS 
may be the way to go for the future on a lot of these things.  
But when you look to the Internet, you need to recognize 
that we are not New York City, New York State, or even the 
United States.  The Internet is a very global network; it is 
global communication. 
When we talk about the First Amendment, we are focus-
ing on the United States.  When we talk about community 
standards, we are focusing on a community within the 
United States, however we structure that.  As Americans, we 
tend to think that the world revolves around our standards 
and our law.  It does not.  For example, when a neo-Nazi 
puts something on a site in Illinois, which may be incredibly 
offensive to most of us, it is protected speech within the 
United States.224  When that Web site can be accessed by 
someone in Germany, that same text would be deemed 
criminal because of neo-Nazi criminal laws.  If that person is 
aware of that the German prosecutors are looking for him, 
he will not go to Germany; if he goes to Denmark, however, 
 
223. For example, Surf Watch, a leader in content filtering software, “lets 
parents, teachers and employers block unwanted sexually explicit and other ma-
terial from their computers’ Internet access—without restricting the access rights 
of other Internet users.”  Surf Watch Content Filtering Software from Spyglass In-
cluded in Microsoft’s Internet Explorer Starter Kit, PR NEWSWIRE ASS’N, Oct. 15, 
1996; see also ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 841-42. 
224. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (invalidating Ohio Crimi-
nal Syndicalism Act that made advocating violence as a means of political reform 
a criminal act).  In Brandenburg, the Court upheld the right of a Ku Klux Klan 
member to speak out at a Klan rally, disregarding the racially offensive content 
of his speech.  Id.  The Court also overruled Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 
(1927), in which the Court had previously held that a state may outlaw advocat-
ing violent means to effect political and economic change.  Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 
at 449.  The Court rested its decision on the “principle that the constitutional 
guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a state to forbid or pro-
scribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advo-
cacy is directed to [and likely to produce] imminent lawless action.”  Id. at 447. 
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he may be extradited to Germany because of a Danish-
German treaty concerning neo-Nazi criminals.  Unantici-
pated consequences?  Certainly.  Who would anticipate that 
someone who does something in Illinois can get arrested in 
Germany just because the world does not see things the way 
we do.225 
So, we can talk about First Amendment all we want, but 
we must understand that there are global standards and 
there are substantial jurisdictional issues:  district court 
judges in this country are saying, “You have a Web site?  
Gotcha in Connecticut.”  It is a presence, a nexus, and they 
can sue you here.226  And judges around the country, be-
cause of their general lack of understanding of cyberspace, 
are saying the same thing.  They are saying that you have to 
be very cautious about what you are saying, even without 
considering the legal effects of the CDA.227  You have to look 
at what you are saying and look at world standards. 
Just as background, let me explain about privacy on the 
 
225. An American attorney working in Frankfurt, Germany, who is very 
familiar with German cyberspace issues noted:  “The Internet created a universal 
jurisdiction, so that once you are on the Internet you are subject to the laws of 
every country in the world.”  German Student Faces Charges Over Internet Site, 
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 6, 1997, at 11D.  For an example of a present day 
example of the previous scenario, see id.  In Germany, a 25 year-old German uni-
versity student faced criminal charges for creating an Internet home page pro-
viding an electronic link to a left-wing newspaper which, among other things, 
offered terrorism advice.  Id. 
226. See Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 
1996).  In Inset, a Connecticut corporation brought trademark infringement action 
against Massachusetts corporation that allegedly used its trademark as an Inter-
net domain name.  Id. at 161.  In denying defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack 
of personal jurisdiction and improper venue, the District Court, Covello, J., held 
that:  (1) foreign corporation’s advertising via the Internet was solicitation of suf-
ficient repetitive nature to satisfy “solicitation of business” provision of Con-
necticut long-arm statute; (2) foreign corporation had sufficient minimum con-
tacts with Connecticut to support exercise of personal jurisdiction; and (3) 
foreign corporation was, for venue purposes, deemed to reside in Connecticut.  
Id. 
227. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223; see, e.g., Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 
1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996). 
   
522 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [7:463 
Net.  The Electronic Frontier Foundation is a very good Web 
site.228  If you are looking for a URL that will give you a lot 
of information on censorship issues on the Net, you should 
access it at <www.eff.org>.  It will help you understand the 
tensions between privacy and free speech. 
One of the mechanisms suggested in the CDA is that 
Webhosts screen visitors to their site to ensure that minors 
do not have access to “indecent” material.229  It contemplates 
adult identification cards or use of a credit card, as indicia of 
majority.  Registering, or giving credit card information for 
access to certain sites, involves giving up information about 
yourself to a lot of people out there whom you might not 
want to have that information.  The Web is an unlimited 
source of information about demographics which can de-
prive many visitors of privacy rights, as it is.  A lot of us on 
the Net, knowing how much information can be derived 
from reversed domain and other identification programs 
used at many sites, are very careful about the kind of statis-
tics we glean from people who access our sites. 
So, you have this tension.  It is easy to say, “Sure; reg-
ister; put in your credit card information; forget security and 
encryption issues for the time being; register and we will 
know who you are, and we will be able to check it and know 
how many times you hit this site that somebody else might 
think is indecent.”  Where you go with “Big Brother” infor-
mation is all part of what people who are concerned in the 
Net community are worried about.  Using information ob-
tained from the Electronic Frontier Foundation lets us see 
what the world is doing to censor or regulate certain speech 
or access to such speech on the Net.  Canada’s Attorney Gen-
eral said he wanted to figure out how to censor the Net be-
cause he was concerned about “hate Web sites” and “white 
 
228. Electronic Fromtier Foundation, (visited Apr. 20, 1997) 
<http://www.eff.org/ pub/censorship/online_services>. 
229. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223. 
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power Web sites.”230  Germany just blocked an entire online 
service because a large Netherlands service, similar to AOL 
or Compuserve, provided access to one Web site that the 
German government considered offensive.  The Nether-
lands’ online service provider refused to censor the site.231  
So, the German government blocked access to this Nether-
lands service in its country.232 
Where are we going with country by country standards 
and censorship?  In Singapore, Saudi Arabia, and mainland 
China, everything runs through government servers which 
screen what is deemed appropriate for Webbers located in 
that country. 
What is going to happen next to information on the Net 
on a global basis?  Once we get past what is decent or inde-
cent in the United States, and what is obscene or not obscene 
in the United States, we need to understand that there is 
speech that may be protected under any of our standards in 
the United States that may be criminal someplace else in the 
world. 
So, what I am doing is not in any way capping the analy-
sis by review of the CDA.233  I want you to be aware of the 
expansiveness of communication on the Internet and the 
ramifications of putting something on your Web site, of 
sending something by e-mail to someone, and of access-
ing someone else’s Web site.  And I want you to understand 
how global all of these legal issues are—jurisdictional, pri-
vacy, free speech, criminal—whether you are talking about 
minimum contacts, constitutional issues, state constitution, 
federal Constitution.  These are the tensions that we have to 
balance, both in the United States and around the world. 
 
230. See generally White Supremacy, Hatewatch (visited Apr. 20, 1997) 
<http:// hatewatch.org>. 
231. Electronic Frontier Foundation (visited Apr. 20, 1997) 
<http://www.eff.org/ pub/censorship/online_services>. 
232. Id. 
233. Id. 
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So, when you come down either in favor of against the 
CDA, or the state equivalents of the DCS,234 as they may be 
adopted from time to time, you need to examine those stan-
dards in a global setting.  I am a cyberlaw practitioner.  I see 
cyberlaw globally and I want you to understand these issues 
and see them globally as well. 
When regulating the Net, do you use the standards that 
are being used for every other media?235  Do you use the 
standards that have developed over the last 200 years in this 
country, or do you create a new standard because of the 
unique nature of the Internet media? 
What we are talking about is creating a different stan-
dard for certain communication than you have elsewhere 
under the law.  The problem is that the best thing about the 
Net is also the worst thing about the Net:  we are all one 
gender, we are all one age, none of us are disabled, we are as 
smart as we are, as articulate as we are.  Right now, the 
common language on the Internet is English;236 we all speak 
English.  We are anonymous. 
With a first name like “Parry,” most of the people in the 
world think I am a man, and I get a lot of e-mail saying 
things like, “It is great that you are doing this.  Those women 
. . . .”  I have to point these people to my Website and my 
photo so that they understand. 
But, as I said, the beauty of the Web is also the biggest 
problem that we are facing.  For example, how much can 
you believe from an anonymous communication?  A forty-
seven-year-old guy in Ohio said he was a fifteen-year-old 
boy who was very interested in this twelve-year-old girl.237  
 
234. NEED TO CALL AFTAB AND FIND OUT WHAT THIS IS. DEP’T OF CIVIL SERVICES 
OR DEP’T OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES? 
235. For an explanation of the different media standards, see supra note 1. 
236. Candee Wilde, Industry Moving to Multilingual Internet, COMMS. WK. 
INT’L, Mar. 4, 1996, at 22. 
237. See Internet Seductions and Statutory Rape, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Feb. 
16, 1997, at 10B. 
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Who really knows?  If you read profiles on AOL, you will 
understand that it is the best fiction you have ever read.  
People on the Net can reinvent themselves, merely by saying 
they are what they had always hoped they would be.238 
But understand that when you enter the Web, you have 
gone “through the looking glass,” notwithstanding that often 
regular laws will apply in cyberspace as well as in regular 
space.  A crime perpetrated in cyberspace is no less a crime; 
it only uses a new medium. 
But before everyone starts regulating or running to find a 
new way of regulating the Net to make it safe for the world, 
I want you to recognize the tension between what should be 
done and what is doable.  Before we censor, let us ask our-
selves what alternative we have.  Is there filtering and block-
ing software?  Yes.239  Are there ways to regulate certain ac-
tivity on the Web?  Sure.  Is it going to get there during my 
lifetime?  That depends on how long I live.  But I want you 
to recognize that all of these exist.  As law students, as future 
lawyers, and as practicing lawyers, we need to search for 
balance.  We must see it as a global issue.  Do not see us as 
Americans, or New Yorkers, or New York City people, or as 
law students.  Just see it far more globally and understand 
that that is what you are facing.  It will take more creativity 
and a broader understanding of legal and social issues.  We 
will be expected to pull it all together, and know far more 
than we have ever known before.  We will need to build 
global, cross-disciplinary teams of computer technology ex-
perts, online service providers, defamation and media legal 
experts, constitutional law and international law experts, 
and teams of these experts from around the world. 
When you face free speech on the Internet, you face all of 
 
238. Rosie Mestel, Long Distance Cyberporn in Memphis, TN, NEW SCI., Aug. 
14, 1994, at S1. 
239. See, e.g., supra note 223 (discussing SurfWatch, one type of filtering and 
blocking software). 
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these issues that are policy and practical issues, and we are 
going to try to grapple with how to take all of the jurispru-
dence that we have brought to the world and find a way of 
keeping them in balance to allow this incredible medium to 
enrich our lives and the lives of generations to come. 
Thank you. 
MR. JOLLYMORE:  Now we would like to take a few 
questions. 
QUESTION:  This question is for Mr. Hirt or Ms. Aftab.  
The Shea decision contained a footnote that lumped together 
content that is transmitted with content that is simply made 
available on the Internet.240  Is there any problem with this 
lumping together of what essentially seem to be two differ-
ent kinds of Internet content, the transmitted type and the 
made-available type? 
MR. HIRT:  I will try to take a stab at the question. 
The statute does have textual differences in terms of A’s 
transmitting to B as opposed to A’s displaying and therefore 
making available to B through an infinite number people.241  
The so-called display provision, section 223(d)(1)(B), was en-
joined.242  But the courts did—the Philadelphia court in par-
ticular—243 because it had problems with the term “inde-
cent” as used in 223(a), and so it also enjoined that 
provision.244 
The Solicitor General’s brief says that it is one thing to 
look at D and find problems with the displaying of content, 
but where you are intentionally sending content directly 
from A to B, especially if you know that B is under eighteen, 
 
240. Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 925 n.2 (“We use the term ‘content’ to refer to any 
text, data, sound, program, or visual image transmitted over or made available 
for retrieval on an interactive computer service.”). 
241. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a)(1)(B), 223(d)(1)(A). 
242. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d). 
243. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 828. 
244. Id. at 883. 
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that is a different issue.  So that is the footnote; I cannot 
vouch for it, but if those are the two types of conduct, they 
are enjoinable; there is a difference in terms of how the stat-
ute operates.  Now, Mr. Hansen may disagree with me as to 
whether it should operate that way or whether it constitu-
tionally can operate that way, but there are different provi-
sions of the CDA that have these different implications. 
MS. AFTAB:  Was your concern with your ability to re-
ceive something by e-mail, or were you concerned with your 
ability to access it from a Website, whether voluntary or in-
voluntary? 
QUESTIONER:  I think the concern of the court’s particu-
lar approach in writing the decision was the definition of 
content.  Footnote two of Shea says content includes the text, 
the sound, or the images, and then it runs into the same 
strain as the description of the definition.  Yet, the CDA 
seems to break it out.245  So, I wonder whether the court has 
made some sort of mistake.  If this is the case, future courts 
will not be very clear, they will just continue to lump things 
together.  If, for example, the CDA is found constitutional, 
we might get a broad-brush problem. 
MS. AFTAB:  I cannot comment on the Shea footnote be-
cause I do not recall it.  But, I can tell you that many of the 
judges are looking at jurisdictional issues, such as whether it 
is information that is being sent to someone by way of unso-
licited e-mail or list serves, or something that needs to be ac-
cessed from someone’s Web site to determine the location of 
information.  Although they consider the voluntary nature of 
the communication, most courts are still coming to the same 
conclusion.  They find that you are subject to the jurisdiction 
of their courts. 
QUESTION:  Why is it that a lot of Web masters do not 
make their sites accessible to blind people who use com-
 
245. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223. 
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puters with speech capability, and what can be done about it 
from a technological standpoint? 
MS. AFTAB:  It looks like I am the technology person 
again. 
There are different kinds of Web sites.  There are com-
mercial Web sites that cost a lot of money, and then there are 
Web sites that you or your neighbor may have put up.  I 
keep my own Web site up and running, which is why none 
of my links work on a regular basis. 
But there is a rapid growth of audio on the Net through 
Java and other technology, and a lot of the people who put 
up their Web sites want to use it.  Unfortunately, it requires 
greater knowledge and generally more Web site space with 
the Website host company than most Website operators have 
at this time.  It is also harder to maintain as you add new 
technology to your site.  But, I think that the Web is a perfect 
place to accommodate these special concerns.  Many people 
who have sight disabilities have computers that have speech 
capabilities built into them that are increasingly allowing 
them to use the Internet.  But, it is an important issue and 
something that we should be taking into consideration.  It is 
certainly something I will be looking at for our Web site as a 
result of your question. 
QUESTION:  The Department of Justice’s brief in ACLU 
v. Reno spent a lot of time arguing that the provisions of the 
CDA should be separable, that each of the three provisions 
should be looked at on its own merits.246  I was just wonder-
ing what the ACLU’s position is on whether the three provi-
sions can be separated? 
MR. HANSEN:  The short answer is no.  The government 
will be surprised to learn that we do not agree with them.  
The government did not make this argument below; this is 
 
246. Brief for the Appellant at 18, Reno v. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 
1996) (No. 96-511). 
 1997] SYMPOSIUM⎯CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CDA 529 
something it has invented now that it has reached the Su-
preme Court.  If you read the government’s brief carefully, 
you will find that we still do not exactly know what its posi-
tion is. 
The government takes the position that the two knowing 
clauses prohibit an individual from knowingly sending in-
decent material to a minor.247  But the example it uses is 
enormously illustrative:  it says if an individual goes into a 
chat room or onto a news group and discovers that some-
body in the chat room or in the news group is a minor, then 
thereafter that individual may not send private e-mail that is 
indecent to that minor.  Through its method of analysis, the 
government also implies that if the individual continues to 
speak to the news group or the chat room knowing that a 
minor has recently been there, that individual risks going to 
jail under the indecency provision.248 
What the government has refused thus far to clearly ad-
dress is whether the knowing provisions apply to communi-
cations between one person to one person, or whether they 
apply to any of the various one-to-many communications, 
like chat rooms and news groups.  If those two provisions 
apply to the one-to-many conversations and address the 
situation where I enter a news group and I see that two mes-
sages above me someone has posted a message that says, 
“I’m seventeen and I come to this news group all the time,” 
we still have the same problem.  We would still have exactly 
the same problem that adults now have which required 
them to censor their speech in order to deal with the fact that 
there are some minors out there.  The government has studi-
ously refused to go near this question and analyze it that 
way. 
MR. JOLLYMORE:  Chris, I am intrigued by your back-
ground as an advocate for children’s rights.  Let me ask you 
 
247. Id. at 15. 
248. Id. 
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this:  Dave Pawlik made the statement that there is a prob-
lem with indecency on the Internet concerning children.  Is 
that true?  Is it injurious to kids to be exposed to indecency 
on the Net; if so, is there anything that the government can 
do to protect kids? 
MR. HANSEN:  It depends.  The answer to the first part 
of your question depends on what you mean by indecency, 
the age of the kid, the maturity of the kid, and the nature of 
the speech.  There is certainly some speech on the Internet 
that probably all of us would agree we would not want six-, 
seven-, or eight-year-olds to see.  There is probably also 
speech on the Internet that some of us would find appropri-
ate for a seventeen-year-old and some of us would find of-
fensive for a seventeen-year-old.  So, part of the problem, in 
terms of whether there is a sufficient interest in banning 
speech to children, depends on with what we are dealing. 
MR. JOLLYMORE:  What if we take the first category, the 
speech we would all agree that we do not want certain age 
groups to see? 
MR. HANSEN:  And what about that speech? 
MR. JOLLYMORE:  Well, is there anything the govern-
ment can do to protect kids? 
MR. HANSEN:  Absolutely.  What the government ought 
to do in that context is something that is effective.  One of 
the many problems of the CDA is that it does not reach over-
seas sites.  If the CDA is upheld, and if it were limited the 
way you just described, that is, to that material that every 
single American agreed was inappropriate for a nine-year-
old, it would still not get the fifty percent of all sites that 
originate overseas.  It is just as cheap and easy to access a 
site in Denmark as it is to access a site in the United States.  
So, if we enforce the CDA, we will not have accomplished 
anything toward the goal of protecting children. 
By contrast, if the government encourages the use of pa-
rental blocking mechanisms, which parents can load onto 
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their own home computers, such software would cover 
overseas sites just as it would cover domestic sites.  It will be 
infinitely more effective in protecting the interests you are 
describing and the interests many people want to protect.  
Therefore, that is what the government ought to be doing. 
MR. JOLLYMORE:  I want to ask one quick question of 
everyone on the panel:  if you can step aside from your role 
as an advocate, tell us briefly what you predict the Supreme 
Court will do in ACLU v. Reno. 
MR. HANSEN:  I am too close to it.  Because I am trying 
to persuade them to move to a particular position, I cannot. 
MR. JOLLYMORE:  Parry? 
MS. AFTAB:  Can I say what I hope they are going to do?  
I hope they are going to invalidate the issue on the inde-
cency that is before the Court.  I just think it is too broad and 
I think it has very dangerous ramifications with the lowest 
common denominator is being what a minor is supposed to 
read.  I hope that the remainder of the CDA survives, espe-
cially the section overruling the Stratton case concerning li-
ability for online defamation. 
MR. JOLLYMORE:  Dave? 
MR. PAWLIK:  I think they will be consistent with the 
channeling aspects of Pacifica and Sable and they will say that 
the CDA is not an effective or constitutional method of 
channeling. 
MR. JOLLYMORE:  Ted? 
MR. HIRT:  Like Chris, I will decline.  Even though I do 
not have a prudent reason for declining, my predictions on 
what judges will do are not a batting average I would want 
to share with any of you, in terms of district court, appellate 
court, or Supreme Court. 
MR. JOLLYMORE:  Let me ask Preeta. 
MS. BANSAL:  I think they are going to strike it down 
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using existing rules, and I think they are going to decline to 
enunciate a broad standard for the Internet. 
MR. JOLLYMORE:  I am going to add my opinion.  I 
think they will strike it down too, for what it is worth.  I 
want to thank our panelists for participating and all of you 
for staying a little later. 
 
